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A PROPERTY THEORY OF CONTRACT
Andrew S. Gold'
By a contract I acquire something external. But what is it that I acquire?
Since it is only the causality of another's choice with respect to a perform-
ance he has promised me, what I acquire directly by a contract is not an ex-
ternal thing but rather his deed, by which that thing is brought under my
control so that I make it mine.t
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INTRODUCTION
Kant was right-when we enter into a contract, we acquire ownership
of another person's deeds. Yet contract discourse rarely recognizes actions
as property.' This Article shows how thinking of contracts in property
terms supports core features of contract doctrine that other theories are in-
capable of explaining.
Developing a coherent theory of contract doctrine in its entirety is no-
toriously difficult. Arguably, it is impossible.2 However, viewing contracts
as a transfer of ownership over future actions renders coherent a large swath
of contract law-from formation doctrines, to consideration, to remedies.
Property concepts bring order to an otherwise ill-fitting collection of doc-
trinal pieces. Equally important, understanding contracts as transfers of
property offers normative guidance for how the law should develop pro-
spectively.
Recently, contract theorists have suggested that the right to contractual
performance can be characterized in property terms.3 Unfortunately, their
explanations have significant normative and conceptual weaknesses. Legal
scholars often distinguish contract rights from property rights rather than
note their similarities.' And, although courts frequently describe contracts
I This may reflect longstanding skepticism in the philosophical literature on property. See, e.g.,
JEREMY WALDRON, THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE PROPERTY 181 (1988) (questioning whether actions can be
owned). It may also stem from the view that property must involve an in rem right, good against the
world. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Property/Contract Interface, 101 COLUM.
L. REV. 773, 777 (2001) (distinguishing contract fights from property rights because property rights are
in rem and "bind the rest of the world") (internal quotation omitted).
2 See Peter A. Alces, The Moral Impossibility of Contract, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1647, 1661
(2007) ("1 do not assert that Contract could not be based on either autonomy or consequentialist bases
alone; I assert that Contract doctrine is too imprecise to support the argument that either perspective, or
for that matter, even an accommodation of both perspectives, could do anything like explaining Con-
tract.").
3 See, e.g., STEPHEN A. SMITH, CONTRACT THEORY 72 (2004) [hereinafter SMITH, CONTRACT
THEORY] (suggesting that a promissory theory of contract must explain "why a promisee can fairly be
regarded as owning a right to the promisor's performance of the promised act"); Stephen A. Smith, To-
wards a Theory of Contract, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE: FOURTH SERIES 107, 123 (J. Hor-
der ed., 2000) [hereinafter Smith, Towards a Theory of Contract] ("On the right-creation view of
contract, a contract creates what is in effect a property right in the promisee, albeit a property right in the
performance of an act."); Ernest J. Weinrib, Punishment and Disgorgement as Contract Remedies, 78
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 55, 68 (2003) (describing Kantian view that a promisee "has acquired the promise
itself'); cf Peter Benson, The Unity of Contract Law, in THE THEORY OF CONTRACT LAW 118, 134 (Pe-
ter Benson ed., 2001) [hereinafter Benson, Unity of Contract Law] (suggesting the right to performance
is "proprietary in character and therefore fully compatible with the idea of a transfer of ownership").
Benson, however, concludes that it is the "thing promised," and not the performance itself, which is
owned upon contract formation. See id. at 134-36.
4 For example, J.E. PenneT contends that contract should not be considered a species of property
given the difficulty in separating contract rights from the promisor's personality. See J.E. PENNER, THE
IDEA OF PROPERTY IN LAW 123 (1997) ("For us, these are all 'personality-rich' relationships: while we
can notionally regard the object of the right, the contractual relation .. . as 'things', they are not the right
kind of things for property given the way we understand them."); see also Merrill & Smith, supra note
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as a form of property, there is little judicial explanation of what makes con-
tracts property-like.5 At present, the idea that contracting parties own per-
formance rights is undertheorized.6
This Article offers a new, rights-based theory of contract obligation
that builds on ownership concepts. It suggests that the right to performance
of a contract is best understood as a special type of property-property in a
promisor's future actions.7 Contracts can be seen as a transfer of the right
to a future action, dependent upon principles of just property acquisition
recognized in other settings. The means of this transfer is the promisee's
satisfaction of the terms of a conditional promise.
Suppose I agree to walk your dog next week in exchange for ten dol-
lars. Why should this agreement be potentially enforceable, while a mere
promise to walk your dog would not be enforceable? If damages are owed
due to a breach of the agreement, why should they be expectation damages?
There are a variety of explanations one might look to-ranging from the
morality of promising, to reliance, to efficiency-when answering these
questions. This Article, however, suggests that the key element is your ac-
quisition of a proprietary interest in my future action, the walking of your
dog.
Reconceptualizing contracts in this way allows for a theory that com-
ports with two basic features of the private law: the harm principle and the
1, at 787 ("The duty to respect the property of others (and other interests such as bodily security and pri-
vacy of others) has an impersonality and generality that is qualitatively different from duties that derive
from specific promises or relationships."). Others have noted, however, that even contracts involve
rights that apply against the public at large. See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Property, Con-
tract, and Verification: The Numerus Clausus Problem and the Divisibility of Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD.
S373, S410 (2002) ("In general, contract rights, like property rights, are 'good against all the world' in-
asmuch as any third party who intentionally interferes with a contractual right commonly faces liability
for tortious conduct to the holder of the right."). For further discussion of Penner's view, see infra notes
209-229 and accompanying text.
5 See, e.g., Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Corp., 467 U.S. 986, 1003 (1984) (citing Lynch v. United
States, 292 U.S. 571, 579 (1934), for the proposition that "valid contracts are property within meaning
of the Takings Clause"); Omnia Commercial Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 502, 510 (1923) ("If, under
any power, a contract or other property is taken for public use, the Government is liable; but if injured or
destroyed by lawful action, without a taking, the Government is not liable." (emphasis omitted)).
6 In this regard, it is not enough to simply note that contract rights are protected in similar ways to
property rights. See Smith, Towards a Theory of Contract, supra note 3, at 123 ("To suggest that a par-
allel may be drawn between contract and property does not of course show that contract is actually simi-
lar to property, much less that this similarity in any way legitimates contract law.").
7 Although the rationale presented in this Article is new, the idea that contracts allow another's fu-
ture actions to be owned has historical antecedents. For an early example of this idea, see Joseph Story,
Natural Law, in JAMES MCLELLAN, JOSEPH STORY AND T14E AMERICAN CONSTITUTION app. 1, at 321
(1971) ("Another great object of society is the protection, not only of property in things, but of property
(if we may say so) in actions. A great portion of the business of human society is founded upon con-
tracts, express or implied ...."). A similar claim is found in Kant's writings. See supra note t and ac-
companying text (describing acquisition of a promisor's "deed").
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normative structure of corrective justice.8 Both criteria are considered fun-
damental to an understanding of contract grounded on the internal, judicial
understanding of the law. Prior theories have fared poorly under these con-
straints.
The harm principle suggests that the state should not interfere with an
individual's liberty unless that individual has harmed or is about to harm
another individual.9 Put in contract terms, this principle requires a theory to
show how a moral obligation to keep one's promises can be transformed
into a legal right held by the promisee, such that enforcement of the contract
prevents a harm. ° Enforcement of ordinary promises resembles morality
legislation, designed to make people do good, rather than harm prevention."
Corrective justice calls for the rectification of wrongs committed by
one individual against another. 2 Judicial remedies of this sort are not in-
tended to create incentives, but instead to address what the parties deserve.
Within this framework, the duty of the wrongdoer corresponds to the right
of the victim, and the wrongdoer's responsibility to remedy the wrong she
committed corresponds to the amount of the victim's loss. To be consistent
with this idea of justice, contract remedies must do more than respond to a
harm to the nonbreaching party; the remedy selected should match the
amount of harm caused by the wrong.
The harm principle and corrective justice, however, are dependent on a
normative baseline. In explaining contractual obligations consistent with
the above criteria, this Article builds on the foundation that each individual
has rights of self-ownership. 3 This premise provides a normative ground-
ing for the discussion that follows. Starting from the premise that individu-
als own their bodies, this Article argues that individuals own their actions,
including their future actions. Ownership of one's actions, and their trans-
ferability, follows naturally from a robust theory of self-ownership.
Assuming that an individual owns his actions, the question remains
how that individual can transfer ownership to anyone else. Individuals have
8 It should be noted that the argument set forth in this Article is a normative one and not solely an
effort to provide the best or most coherent interpretation of existing law. The harm principle and the
corrective justice approach may in fact be core features of the current law of contract-a good argument
can be made to that effect-but the theory developed below does not depend on that premise.
9 See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 80 (David Bromwich & George Kateb eds., 2003) (1859)
("That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilised
community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others.").
10 See SMITH, CONTRACT THEORY, supra note 3, at 69 ("Enforcing promises qua promises is said to
be inconsistent with this principle because a promissory obligation is fundamentally an obligation to
benefit another rather than an obligation not to harm another.").
I For a discussion of this concern, see Joseph Raz, Promises in Morality and Law, 95 HARV. L.
REv. 916, 937 (1982) (book review).
12 See infra notes 38-44 and accompanying text for further discussion of this idea.
13 This claim is famously associated with John Locke. See JOHN LOCKE, The Second Treatise of
Government, in POLITICAL WRITINGS OF JOHN LOCKE § 27, at 274 (David Wootton ed., 1993). An in-
depth discussion of the self-ownership premise is set forth in Part I.C, infra.
A Property Theory of Contract
a moral obligation to keep their promises, but this obligation on its own
does not justify a performance right in the promisee. 4 A transfer of prop-
erty would explain how a promisee acquires a right in performance, but
only if thinking in transfer terms is itself justifiable. Why should others
have a right to the promisor's actions? The answer to this question depends
on the efforts of both the promisor and the promisee.
As a starting point, a contractual transfer requires the consent of the
promisor out of respect for the promisor's self-ownership. In other words,
transfers must be voluntary. 5 Something more is needed in order for a
promisee to acquire an interest in the promisor's actions that merits legal
protection. The key element in the creation of contractual obligations is
that contractual promises are contingent upon intentional acts of the pro-
misee.
A conditional obligation is what allows for a completed transfer of
rights. When the promisee has performed, he has acted upon the contrac-
tual promise, causing its terms to come into effect. It is this action of the
promisee, in conjunction with the utterance of the promise, which gives the
promisee a property interest in the content of the promise.
Under several prominent theories of property acquisition, it is possible
to acquire external things through interacting with them. Contract is fun-
damentally about the combined effect of a promisor's consent and a pro-
misee's acts. 6 The promisee's satisfaction of a contractual promise's
conditions is analogous to the way in which individuals take rightful pos-
session of physical property.' 7 Meeting the promise's conditions is a means
of taking possession of the promised performance. 8 That possession, in
turn, justifies enforcement of the contract.
Core features of contract law reflect this normative relationship. The
need for the promisor's consent is reflected in contract formation doctrines,
as well as in the doctrines of undue influence and duress. The doctrine of
consideration reflects the need for the promisee to acquire performance
14 See infra Part II.A.
15 See generally Randy E. Bamett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 269 (1986)
(assessing the role of consent in contractual obligation).
16 Cf Peter Benson, The Idea of a Public Basis of Justification for Contract, 33 OSGOODE HALL
L.J. 273, 296 (1995) [hereinafter Benson, Public Basis] ("[T]he consent of one party to alienate his or
her right to another cannot by itself give the other party that right. The second party must also manifest
an intention of the requisite kind; an intention to acquire the right.").
17 Cf Smith, Towards a Theory of Contract, supra note 3, at 124-29 (analogizing contract forma-
tion to theories of property acquisition). Although Smith rejects a Lockean labor theory, see id. at 124, 1
will suggest that Locke's framework actually fits this context well. See infra Part III.B. 1.
18 The analogy to first possession cases is a close one. The primary difference in this context is not
the nature of the property acquired, but rather the fact that the actions are already owned by another in-
dividual. In this respect, my argument differs substantially from Stephen Smith's perspective. Smith
begins with the idea that the performance right is a type of property created through contract, not previ-
ously owned by the promisor. See Smith, Towards a Theory of Contract, supra note 3, at 124-25 (de-
scribing the role of property theory in creating rights).
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rights through acting to meet the promise's conditions. Bilateral executory
contracts and unilateral contracts can both be explained in this way. In ad-
dition, in cases of breach, the expectation remedy is understandable in cor-
rective justice terms. Expectation damages are compensation for the
promisor's dispossession of the promisee's ownership of performance.19
Thus, this theory explains contract doctrine in areas that have proven diffi-
cult for other approaches.
Part I of this Article introduces some basic normative assumptions,
which will inform the later discussion. Two criteria provide guidelines for
assessing a successful rights-based contract theory: first, the harm principle,
and second, the idea of corrective justice. Both are implicit features of the
common law and provide an important means to measure the success of a
contract theory.
This Part also suggests a normative baseline for contractual obliga-
tions. A theory of contracts based on the ownership of property in actions
requires an appealing explanation for recognizing these ownership rights.
This understanding can be traced to the intuition that individuals have self-
ownership. A self-ownership norm provides a means to see one's actions as
subject to transfer and provides a foundation for the subsequent discussion
of how transfers occur.
Part II illustrates why other contract theories have had difficulty sup-
porting a rights-based explanation of contract obligations. This Part as-
sesses the strengths and weaknesses of several leading theories, including
promissory, reliance, and transfer theories of contract obligation. This Part
suggests that a transfer theory is the best general approach, but also that
prior transfer theories provide inadequate justifications for contract obliga-
tion.
Part III shows how a transfer of the right to one's future actions can
justly occur. This Part draws on principles of property acquisition and
adapts them to contractual transfers. The key to an enforceable obligation
is that a promisee has worked to bring a conditional promise into effect by
meeting its terms. The end result is that the promisee comes to deserve the
promised performance.
This Part also reviews several of the major doctrinal implications that
follow under a property-based approach to contract performance. For ex-
ample, an emphasis on principles of property acquisition supports the doc-
trine of consideration. Both unilateral contracts and bilateral executory
contracts can fit within this understanding as well. In addition, applying the
19 A property theory also calls into question several existing contract doctrines. Thus, the theory in
this Article is ultimately normative and not just interpretive. Interpretive theories of contract law seek to
provide a coherent, intelligible principle to understand existing doctrine. See SMITH, CONTRACT
THEORY, supra note 3, at 5 (describing such theories). It is hoped that a property theory like the one de-
scribed in these pages provides a helpful means to understand contract doctrine. However, if the princi-
ples described below are accepted, they may call for some changes to contract doctrine in addition to
explaining current practices.
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expectation remedy is consistent with the promisee's ownership of contrac-
tual performance.
Part IV reviews potential challenges to a property theory. These in-
clude conceptual objections to the transferability of a performance right and
objections based on the norm against providing specific performance. In
each case, it is demonstrated that a property theory is conceptually and
normatively plausible.
Part V discusses areas in which a property theory is relevant to further
development in the common law of contracts. This Part also explains the
importance of this theory for scholarship that seeks to reconcile rights-
based theories of contracts with efficiency norms.
I. AUTONOMY THEORIES OF CONTRACT LAW
Much of the debate over contract theory has centered on two overarch-
ing perspectives: economic theories and what are often referred to as
"autonomy theories" (also known as rights-based or deontic theories)."
Economic theories of contract law tend to take an ex ante approach, focus-
ing on the prospective effects of contract doctrine.21 This is a consequen-
tialist perspective, concerned with the goal of efficiency. There is no clear-
cut definition of autonomy theories, which often start from disparate norma-
tive premises. However, autonomy theories generally take an ex post ap-
proach, focusing on the just adjudication of disputes based on an
assessment of preexisting rights.22
20 See Jody S. Kraus, Philosophy of Contract Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE
AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 687, 689 (Jules Coleman & Scott Shapiro eds., 2002) (describing these two
types of contract theory). For reasons discussed later in this Article, there are differences between an
emphasis on autonomy and an emphasis on ownership rights. See infra Part IV.C. Because the phrase
"autonomy theory" is well recognized, I will use that language. Other approaches, not discussed here,
include pluralistic theories, which draw on a mix of different values. See Kraus, supra, at 687 n.1 (de-
scribing such theories). As Kraus notes, such theories face their own difficulties. Id. ("The challenge
for these theories ... is to explain how their explanations and justifications can be defended in the ab-
sence of a master principle for ordering the competing values they invoke."). Some theorists also adopt
a relational approach, which focuses on advancing a good intrinsic to contractual agreements. See, e.g.,
DORI KIMEL, FROM PROMISE TO CONTRACT (2003); SMITH, CONTRACT THEORY, supra note 3; Daniel
Markovits, Contract and Collaboration, 113 YALE L.J. 1417 (2004). In addition, Curtis Bridgeman has
recently offered a planning theory of contracts. See Curtis Bridgeman, Contracts as Plans (Fla. State
Univ. Coll. of Law Pub. Law Research Paper No. 303, 2008), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract 1097632.
21 See Kraus, supra note 20, at 701 ("[E]conomic theory treats common law adjudication, especially
of hard cases, as the effective equivalent of legislating new legal rules. It therefore analyses the legal
rules at stake in common law adjudication from an ex ante perspective by focusing exclusively on the
prospective effects ofjudicial decisions.").
22 See id. at 701 ("Deontic theory regards common law adjudication as properly confined to decid-
ing disputes exclusively on the basis of pre-existing rights and duties."); see also Benson, Public Basis,
supra note 16, at 283 (suggesting that the "tension between welfare and autonomy values" is "inescap-
able").
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For purposes of this Article, an autonomy theory will be understood as
a theory of contracts that focuses on justice between the parties to a contrac-
tual dispute, rather than focusing on the broader prospective effects of a
chosen contract doctrine. Elucidating the rights of the specific parties be-
fore the court is central to this understanding.
Autonomy theories-at least some of them-also seek reasons for re-
specting contract rights that can be expressed in nonteleological terms.23
From this perspective, recognition of contract rights is not based on the
likelihood of increasing future freedoms or producing some other individual
or social good. Instead, this view suggests that contract obligations are de-
serving of respect regardless of whether they tend to produce other benefits.
It is often suggested that this nonteleological approach reflects the internal
perspective of contract law-the point of view recognized by legal partici-
pants.24
It is beyond the scope of this Article to settle the debates between eco-
nomic and autonomy theorists of contract law. 5 That has proven to be a
Sisyphean task. At this stage of the debate, it is unlikely that a compelling
autonomy approach would win the day against a committed economic theo-
rist's views, or vice versa.26 The intention here is to improve upon existing
autonomy theories on their own terms. Whether or not autonomy theories
are desirable as such will be largely bracketed.
At the outset, then, it may be helpful to elaborate on the normative
framework that undergirds most autonomy-based contract theories-the
present Article included. Two normative premises in particular have come
to guide this approach. One is that courts should follow the "harm princi-
ple." Another related premise is that contract enforcement should comply
with corrective justice. These two norms are standard features for auton-
omy theories of contract, and they are pervasive in common law reason-
23 See, e.g., Benson, Public Basis, supra note 16, at 309 (supporting the use of a nonteleological ap-
proach to justify contracts). As Benson indicates, there are autonomy theories that are teleological in
approach. See Peter Benson, Abstract Right and the Possibility of a Nondistributive Conception of Con-
tract: Hegel and Contemporary Contract Theory, 10 CARDozo L. REV. 1077, 1103 (1989) [hereinafter
Benson, Abstract Right].
24 See Benson, Public Basis, supra note 16, at 309 (suggesting that teleological theories "make rele-
vant, and indeed, central, considerations that are without significance from a legal point of view").
25 For recent contributions in the contract setting, see, for example, SMITH, CONTRACT THEORY, su-
pro note 3; MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK, THE LIMITS OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT (1993); Benson, Abstract
Right, supra note 23; Richard Craswell, Contract Law, Default Rules, and the Philosophy of Promising,
88 MICH. L. REv. 489 (1989); Jody S. Kraus, Transparency and Determinacy in Common Law Adjudi-
cation: A Philosophical Defense of Explanatory Economic Analysis, 93 VA. L. REV. 287 (2007).
26 That is, unless the results under both approaches can be shown to converge, or if both approaches
can be situated within a hierarchy of norms. For discussion of how these disparate approaches might
coexist, see Jody S. Kraus, Reconciling Autonomy and Efficiency in Contract Law: The Vertical Integra-
tion Strategy, in SOCIAL, POLITICAL, AND LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 420 (Ernest Sosa & Enrique Villanueva
eds., 2001).
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ing.27 An additional norm-self-ownership-also plays a central role in this
Article. A brief summary of each follows.
A. The Harm Principle
Autonomy theories have struggled to show why the enforcement of
contracts is more than the mere enforcement of morality or social policy.
The concern is that courts, when they provide contract remedies, should be
remedying infringements of rights and not simply seeking results that are in
some sense morally "good."28 This is an application of a norm known as
the "harm principle."
The harm principle was famously set forth by John Stuart Mill and
suggests that "the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised
over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent
harm to others. '2 9  The principle follows readily from a legal theory that
views autonomy as an important guideline. As Joseph Raz notes: "The
harm principle is a principle of freedom. The common way of stating its
point is to regard it as excluding consideration of private morality from
politics."3 Under this restriction, judicial remedies would not be proper if
their function were to rectify a promisor's personal failings. Charity, for
example, is a moral duty, but the harm principle suggests it should not be a
legal obligation.
For some, the harm principle is justified from a utilitarian perspective;
for others, it is a rights-based norm.3" The meaning of "harm" is also de-
bated. The harm principle has many guises, and commentators tend to dis-
agree as to what should count as harm.3 2  For private law purposes,
however, the harm principle is often understood to address acts that harm,
or will cause harm, to an individual's rights.33
27 This is not to say that all judicial reasoning incorporates these principles. Judicial reasoning often
takes a prospective approach to legal doctrine. See Kraus, supra note 25, at 334-35 (suggesting that
judges might recast efficiency reasoning in deontic terms).
28 But cf Seana Valentine Shiffrin, The Divergence of Contract and Promise, 120 HARV. L. REV.
708, 712 (2007) (suggesting that law "must be made compatible with the conditions for moral agency to
flourish").
29 Mill, supra note 9, at 13.
30 JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 413 (1986).
31 For discussion of the harm principle from both utilitarian and rights-based perspectives, see
Smith, Towards a Theory of Contract, supra note 3, at 109-10, 110 n.7. Smith notes that a Kantian mis-
feasance/nonfeasance distinction can be used to express the harm principle. Id. at 110 n.7.
32 For example, Dori Kimel accepts the version of the harm principle endorsed by Joseph Raz, but
applies it to contract law differently from Raz. See KIMEL, supra note 20, at 104-09.
33 See SMITH, CONTRACT THEORY, supra note 3, at 72 ("[W]hat matters for the purpose of law is
whether individuals' rights have actually been infringed."). Along similar lines, Peter Benson suggests
the importance for an explanatory account of demonstrating that the promisee has rights which merit
legal coercion. Benson, Public Basis, supra note 16, at 293.
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Under the common law version of the harm principle, it is only appro-
priate for a court to get involved if the promisor's action wrongs the pro-
misee by violating his rights-rights that legitimize enforcement.34 From an
internal perspective, courts frequently recognize this limitation.35 Where
corrective justice requires courts to remedy wrongdoing--or more broadly,
to correct a wrong-the harm principle addresses the contexts in which
such judicial action is appropriate. Not every improper act involves an in-
fringement of rights.
This is not to say that courts always recognize the harm principle when
enforcing contracts, or that all theorists accept its requirements. 6 An auton-
omy-based approach, however, generally must contend with this view of
the harm principle, at least as a starting point. This Article joins other
autonomy theorists in accepting the premise that contract remedies are only
appropriate in those cases where the promisee can justifiably be said to pos-
sess rights that would be violated by nonperformance.
Assuming the harm principle is applicable, this still leaves open the
scope of appropriate judicial responses. In theory, a slight harm could pro-
voke a severe sanction, while a gross injury could produce a judicial slap on
the wrist.37 Neither outcome is precluded by the harm principle itself.
Rather, the proper fit between harm and remedy is a question of corrective
justice.
B. Corrective Justice
The idea of corrective justice is central to private law decisionmaking
and is often traced to Aristotle." This form of justice seeks to correct
wrongs committed by A against B by requiring A to compensate B in the
amount of B's loss.39 In cases where A possesses something which belongs
34 It should be noted that a primary concern here is whether a case implicates enforceable moral
rights. This is not just a question of legal rights previously recognized by courts or legislatures. If a
promisee has an enforceable moral right to performance, this would be relevant for harm principle pur-
poses. For a discussion of the idea that some moral claims against others are congruent with the use of
force, see H.L.A. Hart, Are There Any Natural Rights?, 64 PHIL. REV. 175, 178 (1955).
35 For a discussion of the harm principle in terms of an "inconsistency" objection to promise-based
liability, see Smith, Towards a Theory of Contract, supra note 3, at 110.
36 Some suggest that contract law is an area where the harm principle should not apply. See, e.g.,
J.E. Penner, Voluntary Obligations and the Scope of the Law of Contract, 2 LEGAL THEORY 325, 352
(1996).
37 See Dori Kimel, Remedial Rights and Substantive Rights in Contract Law, 8 LEGAL THEORY 313,
332 (2002) ("In Mill's canonical defense of such a principle, the principle sets a necessary condition of
justified restraint of liberty but says nothing as to what measures ought to be taken when this condition
(and possibly others) is satisfied.").
38 ARISTOTLE, THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, bk. V, ch. 7 (J.E.C. Welldon trans., 1987).
39 The relevance of A paying for B's loss-as opposed to paying a fine-is significant for explana-
tory contract theories. Efficiency theories of contract have struggled to explain why the payment of
those damages must go to the party that suffered the loss, in the amount of the loss suffered. See Nathan
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to B, corrective justice would require A to restore that thing to B. For ex-
ample, if A stole a car from B, corrective justice would require the return of
the car or its equivalent in value.
Distributive justice, in contrast, is concerned with the ideal distribution
of resources across a population." While corrective justice rectifies wrong-
doing as between the parties to a dispute, distributive justice deals with al-
locations of resources across a group based on a distributive criterion.4
Liability under a corrective justice approach views the parties as cor-
relatively situated-the plaintiff and defendant have corresponding rights
and duties.42 The plaintiff is entitled to the right that the defendant infringed
and therefore has a corresponding entitlement to a remedy that restores that
right or its value. 3 Likewise, the defendant has a duty not to infringe upon
the plaintiffs right and has a corresponding duty to undo the injustice he
caused.44
Contract enforcement is usually understood to implicate corrective jus-
tice, at least when it is viewed in remedial terms.45 Contract law is occa-
sionally described in distributive justice terms,46 and distributive justice
sometimes may play a role in a judicial determination of whether to enforce
a contract. 7 In many contexts, economic analysis may also explain case
B. Oman, The Failure of Economic Interpretations of the Law of Contract Damages, 64 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 829, 851-59 (2007).
40 See Ernest J. Weinrib, Corrective Justice in a Nutshell, 52 U. TORONTO L.J. 349, 351 (2002)
("Corrective justice links the doer and sufferer of an injustice in terms of their correlative positions.
Distributive justice, on the other hand, deals with the sharing of a benefit or burden; it involves compar-
ing the potential parties to the distribution in terms of a distributive criterion.").
41 See id. at 351-52 ("Distributive justice admits any number of parties because, in principle, no
limit exists for the number of persons who can be compared and among whom something can be di-
vided.").
42 See Weinrib, supra note 3, at 59.
43 See id at 60.
44 See id
45 Law and economics approaches have tended not to apply the corrective justice rubric. Cf Rich-
ard Craswell, Against Fuller and Perdue, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 99, 127 (2000) ("While corrective justice
theory can give us a way of talking about what to do when the relevant baseline is infringed, it cannot
tell us what baseline ought to be selected as relevant."). One might also focus on rights, wrongs, and
recourse without adopting a corrective justice account. Cf Benjamin C. Zipursky, Civil Recourse, Not
Corrective Justice, 91 GEO. L. J. 695 (2003) (explaining tort law in such a way).
46 See, e.g., Anthony T. Kronman, Contract Law and Distributive Justice, 89 YALE L.J. 472 (1980)
(suggesting that rules of contract law can legitimately be used to implement distributive goals).
47 Along these lines, Melvin Eisenberg suggests procedural unconscionability doctrine may be a
means "to prevent the state from shifting wealth to the party who is in the wrong." Melvin A. Eisenberg,
The Theory of Contracts, in THE THEORY OF CONTRACT LAW, supra note 3, at 206, 259.
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outcomes. 4t  But corrective justice principles best explain the bilateral na-
ture of contract remedies.49
As Ernest Weinrib notes, this concept of justice is not instrumental."
In most cases, contract law solely focuses on the relation between the pro-
misor and the promisee. From an ex post perspective, courts typically un-
derstand their role as rectifying the harm to the plaintiff in the amount of
that harm. Corrective justice is a means of respecting both the promisor's
and promisee's rights. This perspective is also adopted here as a criterion
for assessing theories of contractual obligation.
Endorsing a corrective justice rubric does not on its own resolve many
of the controversial issues in contract law. Corrective justice is far too gen-
eral a concept. 2 In order to determine what remedies are appropriate, it is
necessary to define the baseline rights against which corrective justice will
function?3 In addition, other norms may override the requirements of cor-
rective justice.54 The interrelation between this type of justice and other so-
cial values is complex and subject to continuing disagreement.
There are nevertheless practical consequences to adopting a corrective
justice focus. In general, distributive justice and welfare concerns fade into
the background if corrective justice is to be coherent.5 To the extent that
48 In fact, economic accounts are praised as explanations of private law in part because of how well
they fit with case outcomes. See, e.g., Kraus, supra note 25, at 357.
49 There are important differences among corrective justice approaches, however. See generally
Curtis Bridgeman, Reconciling Strict Liability with Corrective Justice in Contract Law, 75 FORDHAM L.
REV. 3013, 3020-26 (2007) (describing distinctions between "relational" and "allocative" approaches to
corrective justice). This Article will not address this debate but is probably more consistent with an "al-
locative" view.
50 Weinrib, supra note 3, at 61 ("This internal connection between the right and the remedy pre-
cludes instrumental conceptions of remedial policy. From the standpoint of corrective justice the reme-
dial issue never involves inquiring into the prospective disadvantage to be imposed on the defendant in
order to achieve a desirable social goal-even if the social goal in question is the protection of the plain-
tiffs right or the deterrence of defendants from infringing such rights upon.").
51 It is an interesting question whether corrective justice is implicit in an autonomy theory, or
whether instead autonomy is a separate value which merely correlates to corrective justice in practice.
See Oman, supra note 39, at 870 (suggesting autonomy may be "itself nested within the principle of cor-
rective justice").
52 Richard Craswell has offered sustained critiques of corrective justice approaches on this basis.
E.g., Craswell, supra note 45, at 121-28; Richard Craswell, Expectation Damages and Contract Theory
Revisited 1, 19-22, (Stanford Law Sch. Pub. Law and Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Paper No.
925980, 2006) [hereinafter Craswell, Expectation Damages], available at http://ssrn.com/abstract =
925980.
53 See SMITH, CONTRACT THEORY, supra note 3, at 147 ("Corrective justice is meant to explain
(secondary) duties to repair rather than (primary) duties not to cause wrongful losses. Primary duties
must be explained on other grounds.").
54 In particular, the affordability of achieving corrective justice in any and all cases may simply ren-
der its application impracticable. Richard A. Epstein, Nuisance Law: Corrective Justice and its Utilitar-
ian Constraints, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 49, 76 (1979).
55 Ernest Weinrib endorses a particularly strong claim of this type. ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA
OF PRIVATE LAW 73 (1995). I think both corrective and distributive justice can be relevant when assess-
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corrective justice is accepted as a guideline, the law typically presumes that
the precontractual allocation of rights is a just one, and courts that follow
this approach tend to exclusively focus on the perceived rights and duties of
the specific parties before them. 6
C. The Self-Ownership Thesis
The harm principle and corrective justice are basic normative criteria
against which an autonomy theory should be measured. They cannot fully
justify an autonomy theory on their own, however. For the harm principle
to be satisfied, there must be an adequate account of how a harm was suf-
fered. Similarly, corrective justice is not a helpful explanation of contract
law absent a baseline conception of existing rights and obligations. To de-
scribe contract enforcement as rectifying a promisor's wrongdoing requires
an account of why the promisee should possess rights corresponding to the
applicable remedy.57
This Article later indicates how a promisee acquires ownership of a
promised contractual performance. I suggest that, in practice, a contract is a
transfer of the promisor's ownership of her own actions to another individ-
ual. By providing consideration consistent with the contractual terms, the
promisee can justly acquire the promisor's future actions. A subsequent
breach of contract would then violate the promisee's property rights.
A significant premise that supports this argument is the normative
claim that a promisor has rights in himself or herself that can become the
rights of others. The acquisition of contractual performance depends on the
idea that individuals have strong rights of self-ownership and, relatedly, that
they have a property interest in their own actions. Autonomy theories need
not adopt a self-ownership perspective, but it is an integral part of a prop-
erty-based understanding. The idea of self-ownership and its implications
are elaborated below.
1. The Idea of Self-Ownership.-The idea of self-ownership is a
longstanding and powerful theme in property law and in political theory. It
has often been proclaimed as a given. John Locke provides a famous ex-
ample of the self-ownership thesis. In his words:
ing contract law, but some applications of a distributive justice framework would conflict with the idea
of corrective justice as a structure for private law remedies.
56 See Benson, The Unity of Contract Law, supra note 3, at 123 ("[T]he analysis of consent-and, in
particular, the principles of contract formation, the liberty to contract or not as one sees fit, and so
forth-do not seem immediately amenable to characterization in terms of distributive justice.").
57 In other words, corrective justice depends upon other norms in order to function. See Craswell,
supra note 45, at 125 ("To be sure, the corrective justice argument may still be formally correct in the
sense that once we have defined the relevant baseline, we may then say that any breach that moves the
promisee below that baseline violates corrective justice .... Clearly, though, it is the other theory-the
one that defines the relevant baseline-that is doing the normative work.").
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Though the Earth, and all inferior Creatures be common to all Men, yet every
Man has a Property in his own Person. This no Body has any Right to but
himself The Labour of his Body, and the Work of his Hands, we may say are
properly his.58
Self-ownership has modem proponents as well, and its recognition
spans a variety of legal perspectives. 9 This continued currency of self-
ownership in legal theory is understandable. A self-ownership premise
provides a normative grounding for tort law,6' lends support for several
theories of property acquisition,6' and-as will become apparent-explains
core features of contract law.62
For many of us, the idea that we have a property in our person is sim-
ply foundational. It is how we think of our bodies, and is closely tied to our
self-conception. Furthermore, it is a rights-based understanding, not solely
an expectation. We do not think we own our bodies based on teleological
premises, in hopes of some other benefit down the line. Our bodies are ours
because we intuitively understand it as correct to view them that way.
Despite its popularity, however, it should be noted that self-ownership
is not a consensus position.63 The idea is deeply controversial, and it is dif-
ficult to demonstrate that self-ownership is the correct point of view.64 Crit-
58 LOCKE, supra note 13, 27, at 274. The related idea of owning one's labor had an early Ameri-
can proponent in James Madison. See James Madison, Property, NAT'L GAZETTE, Mar. 27, 1792, in 14
J. MADISON, THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 266-68 (R. Rutland & T. Mason eds., 1983) (describing
the property "that individuals have ... in the labor that acquires their daily subsistence"). Similarly,
Grotius had stated that "liberty in regard to actions is equivalent to dominium in material things." See
RICHARD TUCK, NATURAL RIGHTS THEORIES 60 (1979) (quoting GROTIUS, DE lURE PRAEDAE
COMMENTARIUS).
59 Compare ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 172 (1974) (discussing "the classical
liberals' notion of self-ownership"), with Peter Vallentyne, Left Libertarianism and Private Discrimina-
tion, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 981, 985 (2006) (describing the positions held by "left-libertarians").
60 See Epstein, supra note 54, at 50 ("Every personal injury action.., rests on an unspoken assump-
tion that each person owns his own body.").
61 Most famously, Locke's theory of acquisition builds on the idea of self-ownership. For a modem
variation, see Samuel C. Wheeler Il1, Natural Property Rights as Body Rights, 14 NOUS 171 (1980).
62 For another recent discussion of self-ownership in conjunction with contract rights, see CHARLES
FRIED, MODERN LIBERTY 69-70 (2007).
63 For a well-developed critique of the self-ownership thesis as a normative requirement, see G.A.
COHEN, SELF-OWNERSHIP, FREEDOM, AND EQUALITY 229-44 (1995). Cohen accepts the possibility of
self-ownership as an idea, but argues against this thesis and in favor of an egalitarian position. Id. Other
recent critical treatments include J.W. HARRIS, PROPERTY & JUSTICE 182-97 (1996) (suggesting that
references to self-ownership are rhetorical and prove too much if accepted); STEPHEN R. MUNZER, A
THEORY OF PROPERTY 41 (1990) (suggesting that individuals do not own their bodies, but instead have
limited property rights in their bodies); and PENNER, supra note 4, at 206 (suggesting that the signifi-
cance of self-ownership is indeterminate). Cf. WALDRON, supra note 1, at 177-80 (suggesting that
Locke's theory of self-ownership involves ownership of one's person, rather than ownership of one's
body).
64 It is also difficult to demonstrate that self-ownership is incorrect. Cf. COHEN, supra note 63, at
209 ("The concept of self-ownership is not identical with the thesis of self-ownership: the latter might be
false, while the former, being a concept, cannot be false, save where 'false' is used, floridly, to mean
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ics have challenged the idea both conceptually and normatively.65 Further-
more, acceptance of the self-ownership thesis need not commit anyone to
the view that self-ownership trumps other values. Self-ownership, if ac-
cepted, may be a largely empty concept if the idea of ownership provides a
weak source of rights.66 The rights that should correspond to this ownership
are themselves contested, particularly as applied to the human body.67 How
far ownership rights should extend given other values is discussed later in
this Article.
By now, the normative debate over self-ownership has reached a
stalemate. Although it has able critics, the self-ownership thesis has en-
dured: it is just as difficult to disprove the self-ownership thesis as it is to
demonstrate it, and the intuition that we own our bodies-and that this own-
ership matters-persists. Disagreements over the desirability of seeing our
rights in terms of self-ownership involve incommensurable viewpoints. As
with corrective justice, this Article assumes the appropriateness of the self-
ownership conception, while recognizing that not all will adopt it as an ac-
ceptable norm.
2. Implications for Transferability of Actions.-As Locke's language
suggests, ownership of one's actions is a natural extension of the concept of
self-ownership.6" In fact, under a Lockean theory of property acquisition,
ownership of actions comes prior to ownership of external, physical prop-
erty-it is through mixing one's labor with external things that they are ac-
quired. The thought that self-ownership includes ownership of actions is
implicit in the concept. To own something is ordinarily to own rights of
use, and this includes use of one's body.
incoherent, or inconsistent, or irredeemably vague, or irremediably indeterminate."). Despite opposition
to the self-ownership thesis as an appropriate way to view individual rights, Cohen concludes the con-
cept is coherent. Id. at 210-28.
65 For an insightful discussion of both conceptual and normative arguments against self-ownership,
see generally id. at 209-44.
66 See Alan Ryan, Self-Ownership, Autonomy, and Property Rights, in PROPERTY RIGHTS 241, 248
(Ellen Frankel Paul et al. eds., 1994) ("[W]e can see one reason why talk of self-ownership may be mis-
guided. Those who so talk presume an agreement on what ownership entails that does not exist.").
67 For example, there is a continuing debate as to whether body parts should be subject to sale or
only to donation. For important contributions, see, for example, MICHELE GOODWIN, BLACK MARKETS:
THE SUPPLY AND DEMAND OF BODY PARTS 149-67 (2006) (assessing the benefits of a market for body
parts); Stephen R. Munzer, An Uneasy Case Against Property Rights in Body Parts, in PROPERTY
RIGHTS, supra note 66, at 259 (presenting a qualified case against the marketability of body parts).
68 See Catherine Valcke, Locke on Property: A Deontological Interpretation, 12 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 941, 983 (1989) ("In Section 27, Locke does not seem to consider one's ownership in one's labor
as a derivative of one's ownership in one's person. Rather he sees one's ownership of one's labor as
simply one dimension of one's ownership in one's person."); cf Adam Mossoff, What is Property? Put-
ting the Pieces Back Together, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 371, 388 (2003) ("The essence of Locke's 'mixing la-
bor' argument is that an individual exclusively owns his life and his labor-such things are, in the Latin
used by Grotius and Pufendorf, an individual's suum-and that labor extends this moral ownership over
things appropriated from the commons.").
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While the idea of owning actions is uncommon in modem discourse, it
is not novel. Natural law theorists historically described our actions in
terms of property.69 In Grotius' words, "liberty in regard to actions is
equivalent to dominium in material things."" The thesis that our actions are
our property is also prominent in James Madison's thought: Madison spoke
of individuals' property "in their actual possessions, in the labor that ac-
quires their daily subsistence, in the hallowed remnant of time which ought
to relieve their fatigues and soothe their cares.""1
To say that we own our actions does not inherently mean that we may
transfer them. There is a strong intuition that individuals should be able to
use their bodies as they see fit. Standing alone, this intuition might mean
that people have extensive rights to exclusive use of their bodies, without
having any transfer rights whatsoever. A norm of transferability calls for
further analysis of the ownership concept.
Ownership is notoriously difficult to define.72 Despite the vagueness of
ownership as an idea, however, many of us have intuitions about the mean-
ing of ownership in the abstract, and transferability is a basic feature of
these intuitions. In fact, transferability is one of the core elements in the
traditional idea of property. 4 For Blackstone, "[t]he third absolute right,
inherent in every Englishman, is that of property: which consists in the free
use, enjoyment, and disposal of all his acquisitions, without any control or
69 See Laura S. Underkuffler, On Property: An Essay, 100 YALE L.J. 127, 136-37 (1990) ("Joseph
Story wrote of property not only 'in things, but of property... in actions."' (quoting Story, supra note 7,
at 321)).
70 Tuck, supra note 58, at 60; see also Karl Olivecrona, Locke's Theory of Appropriation, 24 PHIL.
Q. 220, 226 (1974) ("Grotius and Pufendorf spoke of an individual's actions as if they were things.
One's future actions were included in the suum and could be disposed of like physical objects.").
71 See Madison, supra note 58, at 267-68. For further discussion of Madison's Property essay, see
generally Underkuffler, supra note 69, at 134-38. Although the precise meaning of this essay is open to
differing interpretations, Madison's view that property extended beyond physical objects to cover intan-
gible rights is evident. See Andrew S. Gold, Regulatory Takings and Original Intent: The Direct, Physi-
cal Takings Thesis "Goes Too Far," 49 AM. U. L. REv. 181,203-04 (1999).
72 The classic analysis of what ownership means is that of Professor HonorS. See A.M. Honord,
Ownership, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE 107 (A.G. Guest ed., 1961). As he indicated, there
are a variety of incidents that correspond to rights of ownership, and no specific incident is required.
See id at 112-13. One means to address this definitional problem is to look to family resemblances
among the collections of rights and liberties that correspond to ownership in a given society. See J.E.
Penner, The "Bundle of Rights" Picture of Property, 43 UCLA L. REV. 711, 784-85 (1996) (discussing
this option). In the present case, the setting of self-ownership affects the analysis, however, since self-
ownership is generally joined with specific ideas of individual rights.
73 See, e.g., MUNZER, supra note 63, at 49-50 ("[T]ransferability is a highly important feature of
property as usually understood.").
74 See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN
58-59 (1985) ("What then are the rights of ownership? To this question the traditional answer given by
both common law and civil law systems is that the rights of ownership in a given thing consist in a set of
rights of infinite duration, good against the rest of the world: with three separate incidents: possession,
use, and disposition.").
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diminution, save only by the laws of the land."75 The right of disposition, or
transfer, is fundamental.
Given transferability of property as a general matter, the relationship
we have to ordinary things we own is readily extended to our bodies. On
this view, rights to use your body correspond to rights to use other owned
things, such as a plot of land. Starting from the premise that as an owner of
your body you have body rights comparable to the rights that full owners of
other kinds of property have, a transferable property interest in your actions
readily follows.76
The transferability of subparts of property is familiar to property law.
Severance of a parcel of real property into its component rights and liberties
produces additional types of property, which can then be transferred to oth-
ers.77 For example, an easement is a type of use right that is conventionally
identified as property. An owner of land can rightfully subdivide her prop-
erty and provide an easement to a third party. If bodies are treated analo-
gously, a partial property interest-constituting a right to an action-could
be transferred as well.
Viewing one's body as a form of property can thus have significant
implications. Expansive conceptions of self-ownership recognize a variety
of body rights, each of which is transferable.7" In Part IV.C, I suggest
some limitations to this idea of transferability. Departures from full self-
ownership are appropriate. However, a self-ownership conception, incorpo-
rating the ownership of actions, provides a normative starting point for fur-
ther analysis of the contractual relation.
A robust view of self-ownership allows for a justification of contract
obligations that is consistent with the harm principle. It also indicates how
standard contract remedies are consistent with corrective justice. As the
next Part shows, this is a significant step in developing an explanation of
contractual obligation. Several of the leading autonomy theories of con-
tracts have been unable to get past these hurdles.
II. A BRIEF REVIEW OF LEADING CONTRACT THEORIES
In order to understand the contribution of a property-based theory of
contract, it must be placed in the context of theories that have come before.
75 See I WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *138.
76 See KARL OLIVECRONA, LAW AS FACT 290 (2d ed. 1971) (describing Grotius' view that "[t]he
whole doctrine of promises and contracts is based on the theory of the transference of part of one's lib-
erty").
77 This allows for ownership rights in parcels of property that look quite different from what was
originally owned. See EPSTEIN, supra note 74, at 61 ("[T]he key is the right of disposition, by which the
original rights of use and possession can be transferred, pooled, and divided at the pleasure of buyer and
seller, donor and donee, mortgagor and mortgagee, and so on.").
78 See, e.g., Vallentyne, supra note 59, at 985 (2006) (describing implications of full self-
ownership).
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Each of the leading autonomy theories has appealing elements and ad-
dresses basic features of contractual obligation. However, they also strug-
gle with significant features of contract law. Accordingly, a review of these
theories is helpful both to highlight the insights they offer and to illustrate
the continuing challenges that autonomy theories face.
As noted, the harm principle and the idea of corrective justice are im-
portant standards for an autonomy theory of contracts. They have also
turned out to be problematic. For example, although it is a common ap-
proach for autonomy theories, corrective justice poses a conundrum from a
remedial perspective. Assuming that most contract law is, and should be, a
matter of corrective justice, contracts raise a very basic problem of doctrinal
fit: Why does contract law provide for an expectation remedy?
Lon Fuller and William Perdue famously suggested that an expectation
remedy overcompensates promisees for the harm they have suffered in
cases of breach.79 Rather than provide for expectation damages, the law
could as easily provide damages based on detrimental reliance."0 Arguably,
the harm suffered via a breach is the loss due to reliance, not loss of the
right of performance."1 If so, expectation damages could be a windfall from
a corrective justice perspective. Contract theorists have since viewed Fuller
and Perdue's concern as a basic challenge for a successful explanation of
contract doctrine.
An expectation remedy makes sense if the promisee actually has ac-
quired an existing right to the promised performance at the time of breach.
In that case, a breach would deprive the promisee of something she already
owned. Expectation damages-or specific performance-would merely
make the promisee whole. Just as it is appropriate when someone has their
property stolen for courts to require the property's return or its equivalent in
damages, the expectation remedy in contract law would then be necessary
to correct the wrong.
But absent consequentialist reasoning, it is not a simple task to indicate
exactly why the law should recognize one person's rights to another's fu-
79 L. L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages, 46 YALE L.J.
52, 52-53 (1936) (suggesting, with respect to expectation damages, that "in this case we 'compensate'
the plaintiff by giving him something he never had").
80 See id. at 58 (suggesting that there would be "no necessary contradiction between the will theory
and a rule which limited damages to the reliance interest").
81 See id. at 56 ("In passing from compensation for change of position to compensation for loss of
expectancy we pass, to use Aristotle's terms again, from the realm of corrective justice to that of dis-
tributive justice. The law no longer seeks merely to heal a disturbed status quo, but to bring into being a
new situation.").
82 See Craswell, supra note 45, at 122 ("That is, if the good that is 'stolen' is the performance that
was promised under the contract, it would seem that the proper remedy is either to deliver the perform-
ance itself (the remedy of specific performance), or to deliver the value of that performance (expectation
damages)."). As Craswell notes, however, there are significant challenges for a property-based idea of
contract obligation, such as justifying the decision to view contract rights as property. Id. at 122-124.
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ture performance.8 3 It is a common enough intuition that such rights are ac-
quired, and the idea of acquisition is certainly reflected in judicial rhetoric.84
Explaining why this should occur, consistent with principles of individual
autonomy, has been a lasting puzzle.
Each of the major autonomy theories has failed to provide an adequate
justification for core contract doctrines like the expectation remedy, while
at the same time avoiding counterintuitive premises. The expectation rem-
edy is not the only area of difficulty, moreover. Either these theories are in-
consistent with the harm principle or corrective justice, or else they rely
upon legal fictions. Not all accounts of contract law seek to comply with
the harm principle or corrective justice, but a successful autonomy theory
should do so.
Despite these weaknesses, several leading noneconomic theories of
contract assist in framing the issues that a successful autonomy theory must
resolve.85 Each of these theories has conceptual or normative flaws, but
they provide valuable insights into the sources of contract obligation. Some
of these advances make a significant contribution to a property theory of
contracts.
A. Promissory Theories
Contracts can be seen as legally binding promises. After all, promises
are a basic component of contract formation-parties cannot initiate a con-
tract without at least one promise to perform. Promissory theories build on
the moral significance of these promises to explain contract obligations, and
in the process explain the expectation damages remedy.86 Expectation dam-
ages represent the value of the promise.
One of the most famous promissory theories is Charles Fried's account
in his book, Contract as Promise.87 Fried recognizes that something more is
required for contract liability than the mere intent to invoke reliance in an-
83 The practice of expectation damages can also be difficult to explain from an economic perspec-
tive. See, e.g., Markovits, supra note 20, at 1492 ("The connection between expectation damages and
efficiency is not, however, quite perfect. For example, expectation damages, even in conjunction with a
mitigation principle, can induce inefficient overreliance.").
84 Cases involving assignment of contract rights to third parties provide an example of property-
oriented language in contract settings. See, e.g., Portuguese-Am. Bank of S.F. v. Welles, 242 U.S. 7, 11
(1916) (Holmes, J.) (suggesting that it is "not illogical to apply the same rule to a debt that would be ap-
plied to a horse" with respect to an alienation of a creditor's rights). For discussion of this link between
rights to performance and rights to property, see Bridgeman, supra note 49, at 3031-32.
85 It should be noted that the theories described below-promissory, reliance, and transfer theo-
ries-are not the only significant noneconomic theories. For examples of other theories, see sources
cited supra note 20.
86 See, e.g., SMITH, CONTRACT THEORY, supra note 3, at 59 (suggesting that expectation damages
are "consistent with regarding contracts as promises").
87 CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION (1981).
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other.8 Instead, Fried contends that contract obligations are grounded in
the importance of keeping one's promises. More precisely, what contract
obligations require is the intentional invocation of a promissory conven-
tion."
Promising, in Fried's view, should be seen as a device that free indi-
viduals "have fashioned on the premise of mutual trust, and which gains its
moral force from that premise."9 Breaking a promise violates this trust,
and is comparable to lying.9 Under Fried's theory, values of individual
autonomy and trust support legal enforcement of the contractual promise.2
Fried's description of why we should keep promises is persuasive, but
it never adequately demonstrates why a promisee's legal rights are impli-
cated when contractual promises are broken. A basic objection to promise-
based liability is the harm principle.93 As noted above, this principle sug-
gests that the coercive power of the law should only be used to prevent
harm.94 Although there is a strong moral grounding to Fried's conception of
contract obligation, promissory theories do not cohere with this norm of
private law relationships, which looks to enforce duties only where there are
corresponding enforceable rights held by others.95
The harm principle cannot be squared with contract theories that are
justified solely by promissory duties because no inherent connection exists
between breaking promises and the enforceable rights of promisees. The
duty to keep a promise is relevant as to what a promisor ought to do, but
does not show that a promisee would suffer a harm in the legal sense if
courts left contracts unenforced (or, even assuming a harm, that the pro-
misee would be harmed in the amount of the expectation interest). This dif-
88 See id at 11 ("We need to isolate an additional element, over and above benefit, reliance, and the
communication of intention. That additional element must commit me, and commit me to more than the
truth of some statement.").
89 Id. at 16.
90 Id. at 17.
91 See id. at 17.
92 Fried is careful to distinguish this theory from utilitarianism. See id. at 15-16.
93 See supra notes 28-37 and accompanying text.
94 As Stephen Smith suggests, "[k]eeping a promise, like giving to charity, is praiseworthy-but a
failure to do so should not in itself, be of concern to the law." SMITH, CONTRACT THEORY, supra note
3, at 69-70; see also Benson, Public Basis, supra note 16, at 293 (suggesting Fried's account "does not
explain how the obligation to keep a promise is construed as something other than a merely ethical
duty").
95 It should be noted that ordinary promises may be said to create moral "rights" in the limited sense
that a promisee can justifiably demand performance and even rebuke a promisor for failing to perform.
However, it is not generally thought that ordinary promises render it morally permissible for a promisee
to physically force performance when the promisor does not meet his obligations. For discussion of this
distinction, see Margaret Gilbert, Scanlon on Promissory Obligation: The Problem of Promisees'
Rights, 101 J. PHIL. 83, 89 (2004). See also Benson, Public Basis, supra note 16, at 293 (emphasizing
the importance to contract law of enforceable rights). The rights with which the law is concerned usu-
ally are understood to be enforceable as a moral matter, and this Article focuses on rights which justify
such coercion.
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ficulty plagues theories that focus solely on the morality of keeping one's
word.
A potential answer would look to teleological premises. Individual
autonomy is a guiding principle for Fried's theory.96 Enforcement of prom-
ises arguably increases autonomy because it permits individuals to pre-
commit themselves in certain contexts. Enforceable contracts add an option
for promisors. This response encounters a different problem.
The pursuit of increased autonomy runs into a temporal difficulty-the
reason a promisor's freedom of choice would increase at one point in time
is because it has decreased at another point in time. If the goal is to en-
hance autonomy, it is unclear why the current autonomy of the promisor-
his preference to act contrary to a previous commitment--deserves less re-
spect than his previous preference to act in accord with the commitment.97
Ultimately, ordinary promises are not enforceable, and a promissory
theory of contract must distinguish ordinary promises from contractual
ones. This is not an easy distinction to make on promise-based principles.
Unfortunately, Fried's promissory theory does not adequately explain why
a moral duty of the promisor should translate into a legal right held by the
promisee.9 Invoking the convention of promising, even in conjunction with
values of autonomy and trust, does not bridge this conceptual gap.99
A rights-based autonomy theory must provide an account of why a
contractual promisee is thought to acquire a right to the promisor's per-
formance-why is a contract different from an ordinary nonenforceable
promise? By focusing on the creation of moral duties in the promisor with-
out developing a full account of corresponding rights in the promisee,
promissory theories tend to offer an incomplete normative basis for legally
enforceable contract obligations.
96 See FRIED, supra note 87, at 7 ("[M]orality requires that we respect the person and property of
others, leaving them free to make their lives as we are free to make ours."); id. at 16 ("The obligation to
keep a promise is grounded not in arguments of utility but in respect for individual autonomy and in
trust.").
97 See Benson, Abstract Right, supra note 23, at 1115-16 (questioning Fried's view that a former
expression of choice should prevail over later choices); Eisenberg, supra note 47, at 233 (same).
98 See Smith, Towards a Theory of Contract, supra note 3, at 109 ("Enforcing promises qua prom-
ises is enforcing a duty to benefit others, and thus is inconsistent with J. S. Mill's harm principle .... ").
99 Note that the existence of a social convention in this context does not solve the problem. See
SMITH, CONTRACT THEORY, supra note 3, at 71 ("The underlying flaw in Fried's argument is the idea
that societal conventions should be legally enforced."). As Smith notes, there are conventions, such as
bringing a dinner gift for a host, that do not produce wrongs when they are flouted. Id. Smith has sug-
gested an alternative, promise-based justification for contractual obligations. Smith emphasizes the in-
trinsic good of the contractual relationship as a justification for contractual obligations. Id. at 74-76.
Given space limitations, it is not possible to do justice to Smith's argument in these pages. For an im-
portant response to Smith's promissory theory, however, see Michael G. Pratt, Promises, Contracts and
Voluntary Obligations, 26 L. & PHIL. 531 (2007).
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B. Reliance Theories
Reliance theories approach contract law from the opposite direction,
focusing on the interests of the promisee.'0 ° The idea is that detrimental re-
liance, rather than the intentions of the promisor, calls for legal enforcement
of contract obligations.'' Like promissory theories, this type of analysis
can be grounded in a conception of individual rights. Given the common
understanding that a promisee's reliance on the contract matters and that the
promisee's reliance corresponds to a harm, there is an intuitive appeal to a
reliance theory.
An initial stumbling point for reliance theories is in explaining which
cases of reliance merit compensation. It seems inadequate to say that prom-
ises are binding simply because they are relied upon.' Something to nar-
row the applications for reliance is required, such as a reasonableness
standard. The concept of "foreseeable" or "justifiable" reliance is a vague
one, however, and these restrictions ultimately depend on the conventions
of the society in which the contract is made."3 Given suitably developed
conventions, this problem need not be insurmountable, but the concept of
justifiable reliance tends to be indeterminate.
A more fundamental problem with a reliance theory is that the norma-
tive connection between reliance and a contract is often debatable. Reliance
may exist in cases where the defendant never entered into a voluntary obli-
gation. " 4 For example, an individual might communicate a plan to perform
a future act, but never make a promise. It may even be that an individual
10 Important examples of scholarship that focuses on reliance include P.S. ATIYAH, PROMISES,
MORALS, AND LAW (1981); GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT (1974); and Fuller & Perdue,
supra note 79. For discussion and criticism of Atiyah's particular treatment of reliance, see Raz, supra
note 11, at 923-27. Reliance theories have waxed and waned in popularity. A discussion of their his-
tory is provided in Randy E. Barnett, The Death of Reliance, 46 J. LEGAL EDUC. 518 (1996).
101 See Barnett, supra note 15, at 274 ("A reliance theory is based upon the intuition that we ought
to be liable in contract law for our assertive behavior when it creates 'foreseeable' or 'justifiable' reli-
ance in others, in much the same way that we are held liable in tort law for harmful consequences of
other acts.").
102 See FRIED, supra note 87, at 19 ("[R]eliance on a promise cannot alone explain its force: There
is reliance because a promise is binding, and not the other way around."); cf SMITH, CONTRACT
THEORY, supra note 3, at 79 ("The question is whether such reliance is the key to explaining contract
law-as reliance theories assert-or whether it is merely the by-product of an obligation justified on
other grounds.").
103 As Barnett explains, a reliance theory "ultimately does no more than pose the crucial question
that it is supposed to answer: is this a promise that should be enforced?" Barnett, supra note 15, at 275.
Note also that even foreseeable reliance may not suffice without a promise or some other additional fac-
tor. See SMITH, CONTRACT THEORY, supra note 3, at 81 ("No advocate of reliance-based liability would
suppose that if I say that I intend to teach contract theory next year and then do not teach it, I should be
legally liable to students who reasonably and foreseeably relied on this statement.").
104 As Joseph Raz has noted, promises are by nature voluntary obligations, entailing a state of mind
in order for a promise to be made. Raz, supra note 11, at 930 ("It is essential to the definition of volun-
tary obligations not merely that the state of mind of the agent is relevant to the justification of his obliga-
tions, but that it provides a positive reason for regarding the obligation as valid.").
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induces reliance without being in a position to know he has done so. At the
same time, contracts are often enforced where there has been no reliance.
Read broadly, reliance theories raise the possibility of liability where
the promisor has not committed any blameworthy action. 15 If so, this can
be a troubling result. The point of corrective justice is to correct a wrong or
some form of wrongdoing. Without wrongdoing, it is unclear why reliance
justifies a remedy. As Fried questions, "[W]hy should my liberty be con-
strained by the harm you would suffer from the disappointment of the ex-
pectations you choose to entertain about my choices?"'' 6
If we avoid focusing on the promisor's perspective, a reliance theory
would not reflect the common normative intuition that contract obligations
should be voluntary. As Randy Barnett has emphasized, individual auton-
omy not only calls for freedom to contract, but freedom from contract.0 7
Absent a limiting criterion external to the reliance concept, reliance theories
could cause promisors to face contractual liability in cases where they did
not consent to the terms imposed. For an autonomy theory, this would be
problematic.
Furthermore, reliance theories do not fit comfortably with basic fea-
tures of contract enforcement. Assuming that the harm in cases of a
breached contract is the damage resulting from the plaintiffs reliance, it
would make sense to compensate for the losses due to that reliance.'0 8 In-
stead, plaintiffs may seek expectation damages. The idea that promisees
have a right to performance of the contract is a foundational premise of con-
tract law. If we accept this premise-and adopt a corrective justice per-
spective-then a reliance theory conflicts with core features of contract
obligation.0 9
105 Cf SMITH, CONTRACT THEORY, supra note 3, at 86 ("A reliance-based duty is not fundamen-
tally a duty to ensure that others are not made worse off; it is a duty to pay money to persons who have,
through no fault of the person subject to the duty, become worse off as a result of their reliance.").
106 FRIED, supra note 87, at 10. Fried focuses his skepticism on the idea that promises are no more
than a statement of intention. Id. at 10-11. The argument against liability may be stronger in cases
where a promise is not at issue. See SMITH, CONTRACT THEORY, supra note 3, at 87 ("Looked at from
the defendant's perspective, it appears unfair to hold the defendant liable for the consequences of chang-
ing her mind, given that she never made a promise."). If, however, it is the promise which is supplying
the obligation, then the need for reliance is called into doubt. Cf id. at 80 n.47 ("[I]f it is accepted that,
by promising, a promisor gives up the right to change her mind, then changing one's mind after making
a promise is wrong full stop, regardless of reliance.").
107 Randy E. Barnett, The Sound of Silence: Default Rules and Contractual Consent, 78 VA. L. REV.
821, 828 (1992) ("Freedom of contract entails both freedom to contract-the power to effect one's legal
relations by consent-and freedom from contract-the immunity from having one's right to resources
transferred without one's consent.").
108 See Peter Benson, Contract, in A COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 24,
28 (Dennis Patterson ed., 1996) [hereinafter Benson, Contract] ("[l]f the reliance interest is the basis of
contractual liability, why use expectation rather than reliance damages as the proper measure of recov-
ery?").
109 A reliance theory is also in tension with the idea that the promisee can acquire an entitlement to
performance when the contract is entered into. See Benson, The Unity of Contract, supra note 3, at 175
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C. Transfer Theories
Another possibility is a transfer theory, which suggests that contracts
should be enforced because the promisee has acquired her rights from the
promisor. This perspective has recently reemerged in contract scholarship,
but transfer theories of contract law have a long historical pedigree.' The
basic idea is that the promisee has rights to performance because the con-
tract has effected a transfer of entitlements originally belonging to the pro-
misor.
A transfer theory holds the potential for avoiding the weaknesses of
both promissory and reliance theories. It circumvents the harm principle
objection because, if a successful transfer has occurred, the failure to per-
form can be said to violate rights that now belong to the promisee."' It also
answers Fuller and Perdue's challenge. If the promisee successfully ac-
quired rights to the promisor's performance, then in cases of breach the ex-
pectation measure of damages is simply compensation for that lost
performance. 12
The leading explanations of how transfers occur take several different
forms. Each of these offers additional insights for an autonomy-based con-
ception of contract obligation, improving on prior efforts. Although the
transfer concept is longstanding, the development of a coherent transfer
theory is still continuing with respect to modem legal doctrine. Two lead-
ing transfer theories, those of Randy Barnett and Peter Benson, are dis-
cussed below. My own theory builds on their work, but, as will become
apparent, it also differs in key respects.
1. Barnett's Approach.-Randy Barnett's theory of contracts locates
the source of contract obligation in the promisor's consent to a legal obliga-
tion. This approach is distinct from a promissory theory, despite a surface
resemblance. Where Fried is concerned with the implications of an intent
to invoke the convention of promising, Barnett is concerned with the sig-
nificance of a promisor's consent to a legally enforceable transfer."3
("Reliance-based analysis cannot view the promise or representation as one side of a transfer of rights
between the parties. Thus, there can be no intrinsic connection between reliance-based liability and the
expectation principle, taken as a principle of compensation.").
1 See Benson, Contract, supra note 108, at 41-42 (tracing the early history of transfer theories).
II See SMITH, CONTRACT THEORY, supra note 3, at 99 ("Transfer theories are not vulnerable to the
harm principle objection .... If I transfer a right to performance to you, you own this right; if I fail to
perform, I have interfered with your property rights.").
112 See id. at 100 ("[T]ransfer theories have a ready explanation for the main features of contract
remedies: if the plaintiff owns the defendant's performance, then expectation damages and specific per-
formance are appropriate remedies. If you steal or break my property, it is right that you should give me
back my property or compensate me for its full value."); see also infra, Part II1.C.2 (explaining how a
property theory of contracts is consistent with the expectation remedy).
113 1 have doubts that the norm of contract enforcement requires consent to legal enforcement, but
Barnett is correct that consent is fundamental to contract. One disadvantage of Barnett's theory is that it
apparently requires a legal system to be in place in order to fully explain contract enforcement. I would
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Barnett begins his analysis by indicating the importance of individual
entitlements to contract law. 4 He suggests that contract law involves a
valid transfer of preexisting entitlements and that such a transfer requires
the transferor to give consent." 5 Under this theory, "[l]egal enforcement is
morally justified because the promisor voluntarily performed acts that con-
veyed her intention to create a legally enforceable obligation by transferring
alienable rights.""' 6
A shift from promise to consent to legal obligations offers an explana-
tion for why courts apply an objective standard when interpreting contract
language, rather than insisting on strict compliance with the subjective in-
tent of the promisor. A properly functioning system of legal entitlements
requires the boundaries of these entitlements to be ascertainable to the af-
fected parties.117 As Barnett indicates, the other party to a transaction will
not have all the information that may be available to a court seeking evi-
dence of subjective intent after the fact.'
Barnett's focus on precontractual individual entitlements is an impor-
tant contribution to contract theory. The underlying system of property
recognition affects what can be properly transferred in the first place, and it
also indicates how the process of transfer can go awry. Contracting parties
suggest that the sense people have that breaching a contract is wrongful would apply even without legal
conventions. Cf Eisenberg, supra note 47, at 248 (suggesting, in light of social propositions, that "a
promisee is reasonable in relying on a promise even if he does not know that a relied-upon promise is
legally enforceable").
114 Bamett, supra note 15, at 291-300. In Bamett's view, "the consent of the rights holder to be le-
gally obligated is the moral component that distinguishes valid from invalid transfers of alienable rights
in a system of entitlements." Id. at 299.
115 Id. at 297 ("[C]ontract law concerns enforceable obligations arising from the valid transfer of
entitlements that are already vested in someone .... "). The prior ownership of these entitlements gives
consent a central place under Barnett's theory. See id. ("[Tihe valid transfer ... is what makes consent
a moral prerequisite to contractual obligation.").
116 Id. at 300.
117 Id. at 302.
118 Id. at 305. Melvin Eisenberg has questioned whether Bamett's understanding of consent is what
consent is ordinarily understood to mean. Eisenberg, supra note 47, at 233 ("Barnett's usage, however,
varies from the normal meaning of consent. Consent is a subjective, not an objective, concept."). In
Eisenberg's view, a consent requirement conflicts with the standard principles of interpreting contractual
language based on objective meaning. However, objective legal standards are often used to infer a sub-
jective state of mind. See Andrew S. Gold, A Decision Theory Approach to the Business Judgment
Rule: Reflections on Disney, Good Faith, and Judicial Uncertainty, 66 MD. L. REv. 398, 427-28 (2007)
(describing examples of this approach in corporate law). In addition, there is an important line to be
drawn between intent to promise and intent as to a promise's meaning. For further discussion of this
latter issue, see infra notes 161-162.
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may not transfer what they do not properly own."9 Thus, contracts are not
binding where the promised performance is illegal. 2°
In addition, an entitlement-based conception also offers a normative
limit on when transfers can occur. Assuming that the promisor is a rightful
owner of the property at issue, the promisor's consent to a transfer is a nec-
essary element of a just transfer.'2 ' Unless they are culpable in some way,
owners of entitlements are not generally subjected to transfer of their enti-
tlements unless they have chosen to donate or exchange their property.
In light of these features, Barnett's theory is appealing. But it is also
an incomplete justification for contractual obligation. A major weakness in
Barnett's theory is that it focuses on only one required consent, that of the
transferor.'22 This is.only half of the picture. Ordinarily, transfers of enti-
tlements require the consent of the transferee as well.'23
As Peter Benson has noted, exchanges involve two intentional acts:
"[F]or there to be a completed gift or exchange, something more is required
than just the transferor's act of alienation. The transferee must also take
possession of the transferred object for there to be acquisition."' 24 A promi-
sor's consent to an alienation of legal rights can create a moral duty to per-
form on the promisor's part. But the existence of this moral duty does not
adequately explain why the promisee should possess enforceable rights to
the promisor's performance. As with Fried's promissory theory, Barnett
fails to explain why a moral duty should correspond to enforceable rights in
another party.'25
119 Cf Barnett, supra note 15, at 292 ("Whether a purported right is genuine or can be legitimately
transferred is not an issue of contract theory only, but is one that may also require reference to the under-
lying theory of entitlements-that is, the area of legal theory that specifies what rights individuals have
and the manner by which they come to have them.").
120 Cf id at 290 (noting that process-based theories cannot explain why "agreements to perform il-
legal acts should not be enforceable"). Since illegal acts are not an entitlement of the promisor, they
may not be transferred.
121 See supra note 107.
122 Another concern for Bamett's theory is the suggestion that it may suffer from a circularity prob-
lem. See TREBILCOCK, supra note 25, at 184 ("[O]bjective theories of intent risk some of the same
problems of circularity that Barnett attributes to reliance or welfare theories-that is, do parties under-
stand certain language to have particular legal connotations because the law says so, or does the law at-
tach certain legal connotations to particular language because the parties believe that the language has
these connotations?"). The theory of consent described in this Article, however, is not dependent upon
legal conventions for its force.
123 See Benson, Unity of Contract Law, supra note 3, at 148 (noting "the fundamental idea that a
transfer of right requires two parties and two acts of will: There must be alienation and appropriation").
124 Benson, Public Basis, supra note 16, at 296; see also Benson, Contract, supra note 108, at 41-
42 (describing the elements of a transfer). Benson also claims that Barnett's theory "does not preserve
the required standpoint of abstraction." Benson, Abstract Right, supra note 23, at 1112 n.57. Barnett
has responded to this feature of Benson's argument in Randy Barnett, Internal and External Analysis of
Concepts, II CARDOZO L. REV. 525 (1990).
125 This concern arises even if the consent is understood as a consent to a legal obligation. In Ben-
son's view, this sole consent amounts to alienation without appropriation. As Benson suggests, "While
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Even if an individual has consented to legal enforcement, it is impor-
tant to explain why a withdrawal of that consent wrongs the promisee.
Bamett's theory helps justify the enforcement of contracts given a preexist-
ing law of contracts, but it does not explain why contracts are justifiably en-
forced in the first place. Why would contracts merit enforcement if the law
did not already enforce them? Something additional is required if we seek
an explanation of why the promisee has an interest in performance that
would render nonperformance unjust to the promisee.
2. Benson's Approach.-Peter Benson, by contrast, offers a transfer
theory that does link the consent of the promisee to the consent of the pro-
misor. In this respect, his argument adds a feature missing from Barnett's
analysis. Like Bamett's theory, Benson's explanation also relies upon con-
sent as a defining feature of contract doctrine. 26 However, a successful
transfer is not made under Benson's understanding unless there are consents
by both parties.'27
Benson's early work in contract theory is largely based on Hegel's the-
ory of contracts,'28 but his recent writing reaches similar conclusions by ap-
plying Rawls's idea of a public basis of justification.'29 For Benson, a
public basis of justification for contract means that the justification "ad-
dresses individuals in their role as parties to voluntary and involuntary
transactions in which they figure as bearers of rights and correlative duties
that may be coercively enforced."'30 The description below focuses on this
more recent, Rawlsian formulation.
Benson bases this understanding of the public justification of contract
law on three private law principles. First, he suggests there should be no li-
ability for nonfeasance, only for misfeasance.' Second, the law should
a promise made with this intention [to bring the promisor under a full obligation to perform] may cer-
tainly create a relation of trust with the promisee ... this will not be enough to identify it as a relation of
correlative rights and duties which can be coercively enforced." Benson, Public Basis, supra note 16, at
297; see also id ("There may thus be a moral duty to keep the promise without a correlative right to its
performance. Such a promise is analogous to an alienation of property that is not followed by appropria-
tion.").
126 See Benson, Unity of Contract Law, supra note 3, at 148 (indicating that one can only appropri-
ate from another "with the other's consent").
127 Benson, Public Basis, supra note 16, at 296; see also SMITH, CONTRACT THEORY, supra note 3,
at 100 ("For a transfer to take place, both the transferor and the transferee must intend to bring about the
transfer.").
128 See, e.g., Benson, Abstract Right, supra note 23.
129 See JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 223-27 (1993) (explaining the idea of a public justi-
fication). Examples of Benson's use of this framework include Benson, Public Basis, supra note 16, at
305; and Benson, Unity of Contract Theory, supra note 3, at 123-24.
130 Benson, Public Basis, supra note 16, at 305.
131 Id. at 316. As used, this distinction should not be confused with the distinction sometimes
drawn between acts and omissions. See Benson, Contract, supra note 108, at 27 (giving examples of
acts that count as nonfeasance, such as "attracting a business competitor's customer," and omissions that
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adopt a juridical conception of the person. That is, the powers of individu-
als "must be specified in a way that does not give intrinsic moral standing
to their needs or purposes," and they are to be viewed as subjects "with a
capacity to have, acquire, and exercise rightful possession for and by them-
selves." ' Third, transactions are not to be understood as cooperative ven-
tures, but rather as an "interaction between two parties, which.., can result
in the acquisition of or interference with individual rightful possession. "133
The explanation of how a contractual transfer occurs under this rubric
is complex. Benson indicates that a transfer requires assent on the part of
both promisor and promisee. 134 This concept is reasonably familiar under
the doctrine of offer and acceptance. 35 But despite Benson's emphasis on
the legal point of view, the means by which he suggests a transfer occurs
will sound substantially less familiar to lawyers.
As Benson notes, the promisor's and promisee's assents must be tem-
porally sequenced in practice. 136 In his view, one can only accept an offer if
the offer comes before the acceptance. Benson also suggests a contractual
transfer necessarily requires that the transferred thing is never unowned.
137
Under his theory, there must be a continuity of ownership in order for the
transferee to acquire the promised thing with the transferor's consent.'38
The will to alienate must coincide with the will to appropriate.
Given these premises, Benson's argument gives a nuanced and fasci-
nating account of contract law. However, where Barnett's theory fails to
account for a necessary symmetry in contract formation-the dual consents
required of promisor and promisee-Benson calls for an artificial degree of
contractual symmetry. Benson does more than suggest that the promisor's
consent must mirror the promisee's consent. He calls for a radical balance
within the contract: an equivalence of exchange."'
count as misfeasance, such as "failing to warn another of danger in a situation of justified detrimental
reliance").
132 Benson, Public Basis, supra note 16, at 316.
133 Id. at 317. But cf Markovits, supra note 20, at 1517 (suggesting that the parties to contracts
form "a collaborative community").
134 Benson, Unity of Contract Law, supra note 3, at 129 ("[I]n addition to alienation by the first
party, there must be appropriation by the second.").
135 See id at 138-53 (describing how offer and acceptance fit into Benson's contract theory).
136 Id. at 129; see also WENRIB, supra note 55, at 137 ("[T]he two acts must be temporally discon-
nected, because simultaneous offers are mutually independent acts that do not bind the parties to each
other.").
137 Benson, Unity of Contract Law, supra note 3, at 129-30.
138 Id. at 129.
139 Part of the difficulty for Benson's theory is that he seeks a nonteleological conception of con-
tract that provides for equivalence of exchange. This is hard to do. There are, of course, well-known
alternative conceptions, but not ones that comply with Benson's purported restrictions. Compare, e.g.,
James Gordley, Equality in Exchange, 69 CAL. L. REV. 1587 (1981), with Benson, Contract, supra note
108, at 43 (describing Gordley's theory as teleological).
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A continuity of ownership enables Benson to take into account the
wills of both promisor and promisee. Alienation is part of the original
owner's exercise of ownership rights. In Benson's words: "Appropriation
by the second party in accordance with continuity implies ... that the thing
is appropriated at the same time the owner exercises his or her right of
ownership by alienating it."'40 In this way, both the consent of the promisor
and of the promisee play a role in a contractual transfer.
In Benson's view, the only way to meet this continuity requirement,
however, is if the contractual consideration "figures as equal in value to the
promise."'' 1 In this way, the contracting parties "have at the beginning and
at the end of the transaction something that is the same."142
The difficulty here is that a contract requirement of simultaneous own-
ership of one and the same thing is counterintuitive. Although one may
choose to think of transfers in terms of mutual ownership of the exchanged
property, it is unclear why this mutual ownership should be considered part
of the logic of transfers generally. And assuming such a condition, it is un-
clear how the problem of mutual ownership is solved by equating two dif-
ferent "things" as one identical thing in terms of value.
In fact, Benson's understanding of the doctrine of consideration, which
calls for an exchange of "two qualitatively different things,"'43 is in tension
with his idea of continuity, which calls for each party's contribution to be
identical. And, in practice, the law does not recognize that a transferred ob-
ject is owned by transferee and transferor, but rather views it as first owned
by one party, and then, when the proper conditions are met, owned by the
other.
Benson also suggests a presumption that the parties intend to exchange
equal value.' Yet there is little reason to think that a transferor or trans-
feree would anticipate equal economic value as a decisive feature of an ex-
change. It is common, and not especially troubling, for each contracting
party to anticipate that she got the better end of the bargain.'45 We do not
usually think that the only true contracts involve cases where both parties
intend their offerings to be equal.'46
140 Benson, Unity of Contract Law, supra note 3, at 130.
141 1d. at 189.
142 Id.
143 Id. at 183.
144 Id. at 190-91.
145 See Barnett, supra note 15, at 284 n.59 ("In fact, exchange occurs because both parties ex ante
perceive the value of the goods to be exchanged as unequal. Each subjectively perceives the good or
service offered by the other to be of greater value (to an unknowable extent) than what they are willing
to trade for it.").
146 But see Benson, Unity of Contract Law, supra note 3, at 190 ("This presumption of an intention
to transact for equal value is supremely regulative: everyone, just in virtue of his or her role as contract-
ing party, is presumed as a reasonable person to have this intention.").
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Ultimately, a co-ownership of two qualitatively different things that
count as one identical object is hard to recognize in actual exchanges. Ben-
son apparently employs a legal fiction. Perhaps there are good policy rea-
sons to have a legal doctrine of this sort, but a purported strength of
Benson's theory is his refusal to justify contract doctrine in consequentialist
terms.'47 To consider such policy issues also requires grappling with long-
standing debates over the proper scope of the unconscionability doctrine.'48
Since the fiction at issue is counterintuitive and its substantive benefits are
debatable,'49 Benson's principle of equivalence in exchange is a significant
weakness for his theory. 5°
D. Summary
The above examples indicate the difficulties faced by a contract theory
that seeks to comply with the harm principle, to reflect corrective justice,
and to provide a coherent, nonconsequentialist rationale for legal obligation.
However, these proposed theories also provide valuable contributions for
developing a transfer framework for contract obligation.
The arguments outlined above suggest the following conclusions: First,
if individual autonomy is to be a guideline, contract law should provide for
the promisor's consent to be bound. Second, a promisor's mere consent is
not enough to justify enforcement. Promises, and even the consent to be
bound, do not implicate a promisee's right to enforcement; they solely im-
147 See Benson, Public Basis, supra note 16, at 334 (suggesting that a public basis of justification of
contract "does not give standing to any teleological considerations").
148 This need not be a flaw. However, Benson is seeking to justify unconscionability without mak-
ing use of external, noncontractual justifications. See Benson, Unity of Contract Law, supra note 3, at
123 ("[Contract theory] should also investigate whether there is an interpretation of contractual fairness
that fits with the apparently non-distributive aspects of contract.").
149 Indeed, this counterintuitive aspect seems to vitiate the public basis of justification for Benson's
theory. Benson seeks a "conception of contract that is latent in the public legal culture," id. at 124, but
equivalence in exchange is not latent in the way unconscionability is enforced or reasoned in many
courts of law. Cf William Lucy, Philosophy and Contract Law, 54 UNIV. OF TORONTO L.J. 75, 105-06
(2004) (questioning Benson's understanding of the "legal point of view"). Moreover, the idea that mar-
ket value should be able to meet Benson's requirement of equality is itself questionable. See James
Gordley, Contract Law in the Aristotelian Tradition, in THE THEORY OF CONTRACT LAW, supra note 3,
at 265, 317 ("[I]t seems impossible to get from equality in value as a concept in the mind of the parties
to equality in market value as a criterion of fairness.").
150 An additional question raised by Benson's theory is whether the transfer it describes fits with the
internal understanding of performance rights. Under Benson's approach, the thing transferred is not the
performance itself, but rather the object delivered by performance. In contrast, Ernest Weinrib has re-
cently drawn on Immanuel Kant's theory of contracts to explain contractual transfers in terms of per-
formance obligations. See Weinrib, supra note 3, at 65-70; see also WEINRIB, supra note 55, at 136-40
(discussing contract obligations from a Kantian perspective). Under a Kantian analysis, it is the per-
formance itself which the promisee acquires. However, Weinrib's understanding of contracts is in many
respects akin to Benson's, with similar strengths and weaknesses. See WEINRIB, supra note 55, at 137
n.27 (indicating that Weinrib's discussion of several contract doctrines largely follows Peter Benson's
work). Notably, Weinrib also adopts a requirement of equivalency in exchange. See id. at 138-39.
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plicate the promisor's moral duty to perform. A successful autonomy the-
ory should explain a transfer of rights in a way that reflects the interests of
both promisor and promisee.
III. CONTRACTS AS A TRANSFER OF PROPERTY
IN THE PROMISOR'S ACTIONS
Contracts involve a bilateral relationship between individuals. Under a
property-based view, the crux of this relationship is the parties' interaction
with the contractual text. From the promisor's perspective, consent is a
necessary element. Contractual consent, however, takes the form of a con-
ditional promise to be bound. This form of promise is significant. For the
promisee, the conditional nature of the text is the means by which an oth-
erwise moral obligation can become enforceable.
As this Part explains, it is the pairing of the promisor's and promisee's
acts that results in a transfer of ownership. When a promisee successfully
meets the conditions of the promise, he justly acquires a property interest in
the promised performance. In other words, the promisee acquires property
in the promisor's future actions through his relation to the promise's terms.
This theory offers an alternative to the existing transfer theories of con-
tract. Its first supporting premise will be the idea of self-ownership. This
normative foundation grounds contract rights in a type of property. Given a
robust understanding of self-ownership, certain body rights should be trans-
ferable if the original owner provides consent. These body rights include
the right to perform future actions, the core of a contractual transfer.
This Part then explores principles of just acquisition to determine how
a promisee might legitimately acquire an interest in a promisor's future ac-
tions. The possibility that actions are transferable does not explain when it
is appropriate to consider them as having been transferred. Principles of
just acquisition clarify how a promisee can acquire ownership of a promi-
sor's performance. In turn, this analysis demonstrates that a variety of legal
doctrines, including the objective interpretation of contracts, the require-
ment of consideration, and the standard expectation remedy, are all justifi-
able in transfer terms.
A. Contracts as Consensual Transfers
Because individuals own their bodies, it makes sense in the abstract
that they should be able to transfer rights to future actions they may per-
form. That said, self-ownership also means that such transfers should be
voluntary. One puzzle of contract obligations is to explain how the rights
of transferees to insist on performance can be made consistent with the
rights of transferors to decide on a future course of action.
Part of what allows a transfer to occur is a promise. In order for an in-
dividual to be obligated to act according to a contract's terms, she must
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consent to this obligation. 5' This respects the promisor's preexisting enti-
tlements under a self-ownership norm. The difficulty is that, as we have
seen in the discussion of promissory theories, a mere promise does not jus-
tify legal enforcement if courts are to respect the harm principle.
Notably, contractual promises are not like regular promises in that con-
tracts generally involve promises that are contingent on the actions of oth-
ers.'52 In the case of a contractual promise, an obligation is not triggered
and does not vest until the promisee has met the promise's terms.'53 In or-
der for the promisor's consent to exist, the promisee must have acted to
meet the promise's terms.154
This use of a conditional promise proves significant. Before elaborat-
ing on this idea further, however, the implications of a consent requirement
merit further discussion. The meaning of consent suffers from an ambigu-
ity between subjective and objective understandings, which must first be re-
solved. 55
In order to justify a limit on a promisor's self-ownership, consent in-
cludes a subjective element.'56 At a minimum, consent means the promisor
intended to communicate that the obligation set forth in the promise, what-
ever it might be, should be binding. 7 Otherwise, a promisee's claim of a
151 Some commentators have drawn distinctions between promises and consent. See, e.g., Joseph
Raz, Authority and Consent, 67 VA. L. REV. 103, 121 (1981). However, a promise may also be consid-
ered a form of consent. See ATIYAH, supra note 100, at 177 ("[P]romising may be reducible to a species
of consent, for consent is a broader and perhaps more basic source of obligation."). When the phrase
"consent" is used in this Article, it will usually refer to a voluntary obligation that takes the form of a
conditional promise. A promisor that takes on the obligation to perform a future act under a contract has
implicitly also consented to the promisee's possession of a right to that performance if the contract's
conditions are met.
152 Raz has also emphasized this feature of promises in the context of agreements. See Joseph Raz,
On the Nature of Rights, 93 MIND 194, 202-03 (1984). Raz suggests that the right to make conditional
promises is "derivative of the general right to promise." Id. at 202.
153 FRIED, supra note 87, at 47 ("Where the promise is conditional,.... until the condition is ful-
filled A is not bound in law by the obligation of a promise.").
154 Peter Benson expresses a similar idea. See Benson, Public Basis, supra note 16, at 297 ("[T]he
expressed consent to alienate must already contain, explicitly or by necessary implication, a request for a
return manifestation of consent to appropriate, without which there is no intention to transfer ownership
or to invest the transferee with a right.").
155 See Barnett, supra note 15, at 299 n. 121 (setting forth both subjective and objective definitions).
156 Cf. Smith, CONTRACT THEORY, supra note 3, at 61-62 ("[S]ubjective intentions are what count
in determining whether a promise was made at all: a promise cannot be made without intending to make
a promise.").
157 Cf id (contending under a promissory account of contract law that a contractual promise re-
quires intent to make a promise). The importance of subjective intent might seem to be in tension with
the objective approach to contract interpretation. As Smith indicates, however, the minimum subjective
element needed for promising does not require courts to look for a subjective understanding with respect
to the meaning of the contract. Id. at 61-62, 174. Also, it should be noted that courts might use objec-
tive measures as the best available means to locate subjective intentions. Cf Barnett, supra note 15, at
305 ("A consent analysis is genuinely interested in the actual intentions of the parties, but we never have
direct access to another individual's subjective mental state.").
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duty to perform under the contract would not stem from the promisor's self-
ownership rights, but solely from the promisee's reliance. In fact, it would
violate the promisor's self-ownership rights to enforce contractual terms
without at least this degree of subjective assent.'58
Promisors are not like tortfeasors: their rights and duties are not altered
through wrongful acts, but through voluntary transfers.'59 In order for a
contract to justly produce a change in the promisor's rights, the promisor
must at least intend that the promise she expressed will bind the promisor if
its conditions are met. 6 ' She must freely enter into the agreement. By the
same token, only the terms of the promise limit the promisor's rights pursu-
ant to contract because the promisor consented to only those terms. New
terms should not be added because of the happenstance that an agreement
was reached.
On the other hand, the consent element does not preclude an objective
interpretation of the contract consented to. 6 ' A consent requirement does
not mean that courts must be concerned with the subjective intentions and
understandings of the promisor regarding the value of the contract or her
goals as to what it will accomplish. It also does not mean that the promi-
sor's subjective interpretation of the contract language should be decisive. 6'
An expression of consent is a voluntary action, which has objective
meaning given the context in which it was made. This objective meaning is
crucial to the promisee's ability to take possession of contractual perform-
ance, for promisees can only respond to the external evidence of the promi-
158 See also Barnett, supra note 15, at 297 ("[C]ontract law concerns enforceable obligations arising
from the valid transfer of entitlements that are already vested in someone, and this difference is what
makes consent a moral prerequisite to contractual obligation."). But note that this level of consent may
extend to contracts where a contracting party has very little knowledge regarding the agreement's con-
tent. Cf Randy E. Barnett, Consenting to Form Contracts, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 627, 636 (2002)
("Suppose I say to my dearest friend, 'Whatever it is you want me to do, write it down and put it into a
sealed envelope, and I will do it for you.' Is it categorically impossible to make such a promise?").
159 See Barnett, supra note 15, at 297 (making this distinction); see also FRIED, supra note 87, at 2
("[T]he will theory of contract, which sees contractual obligations as essentially self-imposed, is a fair
implication of liberal individualism."). For a recent suggestion that contract law possesses both power-
conferring and duty-imposing characteristics, see generally Gregory Klass, Three Pictures of Contract:
Duty, Power, and Compound Rule, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1726 (2008).
160 Note that an intentional failure of this minimal level of consent could justify a fraud claim or
support an estoppel claim. I am not arguing that a promisor's failure to subjectively consent to any obli-
gation whatsoever precludes the promisee from acquiring rights based on compliance with a contractual
text.
161 See SMITH, CONTRACT THEORY, supra note 3, at 62 ("In interpreting a promise, as in interpret-
ing normal communications, the aim is not to determine what the promisor intended, but what the prom-
ise actually meant-which is determined 'objectively'."); see also id. at 273 ("[I]t would be inconsistent
with the necessarily public and interpersonal nature of promising (or agreeing) to suppose that promis-
sory obligations are grounded in the inner wills of promisors.").
162 See supra note 157 for discussion of the divide between intent to promise and intent regarding
meaning.
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sor's state of mind.163 The contractual expression of consent is the focal
point of the promisee's actions in acquiring the performance entitlement.
Assuming no fraud, a subjective failure to consent should offer a defense,
however. "6
There are pragmatic reasons for an objective reading of consent when
courts assess contract formation. As an evidentiary matter, courts may con-
clude that subjective intentions are best determined by reference to the ob-
jective meaning of the words used.'65 But the decision to enter a contract in
the first place should be voluntary if the promisor's autonomy is to control.
The next step is to consider how a promisee can acquire a promised act
of performance. Contract theory on this question is less well developed.'66
A comparison to other contexts in which property acquisition occurs sug-
gests an answer to this question.
B. Theories of Just Property Acquisition
Several prominent theories of property acquisition can be adapted to
the problem of acquiring a promisor's acts. The promisee's relation to the
promisor's expression of consent once the contract conditions are met bears
a substantial resemblance to other contexts in which individuals are thought
to rightfully acquire property in a thing. The major differences in the con-
tractual context are that the thing acquired is of an unusual type, and that it
is neither unowned nor owned in common at the time of acquisition.
Interestingly, multiple justifications for viewing contracts as a transfer
of property converge. There are a variety of angles from which the pro-
misee's actions in meeting a conditional promise's terms can qualify as a
just acquisition. And, although these principles of acquisition are being ap-
plied to unconventional settings, the norms at issue should be just as rele-
vant for contract-based property as elsewhere.
1. Labor.-Broadly speaking, the process of meeting a promise's
terms resembles the initial acquisition of physical property through an indi-
vidual's labor. Where a contract is binding, the promisee has acted to meet
the promise's requirements, creating the conditions under which it has force
as an obligation. Until the contract's conditions are met, the promisor has
not bound herself. The conditional promise thus requires the promisee to
labor in order to bring about the promised performance. The promisee
163 Cf Benson, Public Basis, supra note 16, at 295 ("For Barnett, the test ensures that, at the time of
transacting, the transferee can ascertain whether or not the transferor has indeed parted with his or her
right and has thereby changed the enforceable boundaries between them.").
164 For a recent analysis of the role intent plays in contract formation, see Lawrence M. Solan, Con-
tract as Agreement, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 353 (2007).
165 For further discussion of this perspective, see supra note 118.
166 An exception is Smith, Towards a Theory of Contract, supra note 3, at 120-29 (discussing theo-
ries under which a property-like interest in contract performance could be created by drawing on an
analogy to property acquisition theories).
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justly acquires this performance through working to bring the promise into
effect.
This is a labor-desert theory of acquisition. John Locke propounded
the best-known theory of this type. Locke describes how a person can ac-
quire property through this process as follows: "Whatsoever ... he removes
out of the state that nature hath provided ... he hath mixed his labour with,
and joined to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his prop-
erty."'67 One way of explaining our sense that the promisee deserves the
promised performance is to note that the promisee's labor, aimed at attain-
ing the promised act, merits recognition of ownership because his labor has
been joined together with the acquired property.
Locke's theory is a much-debated means of acquisition when applied
to physical property, with several well-known weaknesses. It is useful to
examine how the standard critiques of a labor theory hold up in the contrac-
tual setting.
One hurdle for a labor theory of acquisition is to explain why a unilat-
eral act of the acquirer should bind the rest of the world. 6 This hurdle is
particularly difficult for Locke because he starts with the premise that the
physical world is owned in common prior to its acquisition through an indi-
vidual's labor.'69 Even if we adopt the common law view that such physical
objects are initially unowned, as Richard Epstein suggests, it is still a chal-
lenge to explain why a unilateral action should create obligations for mil-
lions of other individuals.'70
In the case of contract, this difficulty of unilateral action is resolved
with respect to the contracting parties. The acquisition does not result from
a unilateral act. It is unnecessary to rely on the concept of hypothetical
consent-as some theorists have done to explain initial property acquisi-
tion-as actual consent supports a contractual acquisition pursuant to the
contract's terms. 7' In addition, from the perspective of third parties, the ob-
ligations postcontract remain in many respects the same.' Members of the
167 LOCKE, supra note 13, 27, at 274.
168 See Richard A. Epstein, Possession as the Root of Title, 13 GA. L. REV. 1221, 1228 (1979)
("The essence of any property right is a claim to bind the rest of the world; such cannot be obtained,
contra Locke, by an unilateral conduct on the part of one person without the consent of the rest of the
world whose rights are thereby violated or reduced."). But see A. John Simmons, Original-Acquisition
Justifications of Private Property, in PROPERTY RIGHTS, supra note 67, at 63, 83 (suggesting examples
of the unilateral imposition of rights and obligations that are "both familiar and widely accepted").
169 See Epstein, supra note 168, at 1229 (discussing this feature of Locke's views).
170 See id. at 1230 (noting that the premise that property is initially unowned does not resolve the
problem of unilateral action binding others).
171 Cf WALDRON, supra note 1, at 176 ("Locke faces the challenge which, as we saw earlier, was
posed by Samuel Pufendorf: he has to explain 'how a bare corporal Act' such as labouring on an object
'should be able to prejudice the right and power of others' without their consent.").
172 An exception would involve tortious interference with a contract. Attempting to entice someone
away from performance of their contractual duties implicates restrictions on third parties that would not
exist in a precontractual context. However, this is a relatively limited restriction on third-party rights in
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public are not free to interfere with the promisor's liberty and possessions,
before or after the contract. Third parties would generally be concerned to
know that a particular thing is owned at all, rather than concerned with who
owns it.'73
Another argument against Lockean theories is that they allow the ac-
quirer to have ownership rights that extend beyond the value of the labor
expended or beyond the portion of the thing with which the labor was
"mixed."' 74 For example, an individual might expend a few minutes' worth
of labor on a twenty-acre tract of fertile land-is this enough to acquire the
entire tract? What if this individual only worked on one acre, leaving the
remaining acres fallow?
In cases of contract, a similar argument could be advanced. Thus, Ste-
phen Smith has suggested that Lockean theories do not fit well as an expla-
nation of contract obligations because the promisee may acquire
performance rights based on very slight consideration.'75 Many contracts
require a great deal of a promisee but many, of course, do not.
Consent answers this argument as well. Where there is minimal con-
sideration, the promisor has decided that a mere peppercorn is sufficient for
a claim to be staked to the promised performance. Just as a statute may de-
termine that a small amount of labor is enough to acquire a piece of land,
the promisor's words may determine that a precise quantity of effort is the
necessary amount for the promisor to part with property in her future ac-
tions. The question is one of authority. Some level of labor is required in
order to give the promisee an independent interest in the promised ac-
tions---otherwise the promisor may change her mind about performing
comparison to other well-accepted acquisition contexts. Cf Roderick Bagshaw, Inducing Breach of
Contract, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 3, at 131, 132-33 (analogizing creation of
an obligation in this context to other settings where third parties are made subject to property-based ob-
ligations). Note also that the inquiry required of third parties in order to avoid liability may be limited in
this setting. See Henry E. Smith, The Language of Property: Form, Context, and Audience, 55 STAN. L.
REV. 1105, 1166 & n.215 (2003).
173 See PENNER, supra note 4, at 82 ("Who owns is irrelevant as long as someone does. The truth
embodied in the idea of passing title is the fact that Blackacre remains the same property as it is trans-
ferred from one owner to the next because, as far as the duty-owers are concerned, it is the same prop-
erty."); see also Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Demystifying the Right to Exclude: Of Property, Inviolability,
and Automatic Injunctions, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 593, 623 (2008) (discussing the duties of
nonowners); Smith, supra note 172, at 1117 (same).
174 See WALDRON, supra note 1, at 190 ("[A]n exclusive right to the whole of the improved object
amounts to something more (and certainly more valuable) than an exclusive entitlement to one's own
labour. Since this extra-the value of the raw materials-originally belonged in common to everyone,
we may ask why the claims of others are defeated to this additional extent.").
175 Smith, Towards a Theory of Contract, supra note 3, at 125 ("It seems clear that a desert-based
procedural theory will not illuminate contract law. The things that a promisee needs to do in order to
create a contract are not the sorts of things which could show that the promisee merits or deserves con-
tractual rights, at least if merit and desert are understood in their normal sense. Extensive contractual
rights can be obtained through doing nothing more than saying 'I agree'.").
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without wronging the promisee-but the promisor effectively determines
the amount that is required for this interest to come into existence.
There is also a conceptual challenge for labor theories. Locke has been
criticized because it is not literally possible to "mix" labor with physical ob-
jects.'76 A similar critique would apply in the contractual context, perhaps
with greater force. It is not literally possible to mix labor with a promise or
with the promisor's future action. Although the promise exists in the pre-
sent, it is not the same type of thing as labor, rendering it hard to imagine
how the promise and labor can mix.
In order to make sense of Locke's argument, he cannot be taken liter-
ally.'77 Mixing labor with a thing is a metaphorical endeavor. Here again
there is a parallel to physical property contexts. Labor may take a piece of
land out of the state of nature, turning it into a useful source of crops. La-
bor can also take a proffered act of contractual performance out of its prior
status as one among many available exercises of liberty and turn it into the
subject of a promissory obligation. Although the future act itself is not al-
tered, its relation to the world is.
It is also possible to reconceptualize Locke's theory of "mixing" labor
by treating it as a reference to the acquirer's identification of his personality
with the relevant thing. This is Karl Olivecrona's approach. As he notes:
We can have a feeling of things being so intimately connected with ourselves
that they are part of our very selves. Being deprived of such objects represents
something more than an economic loss. It is experienced as an attack on the
personality itself.'
This view treats the acquirer's efforts as creating a link between the ac-
quirer's personality and the acquired thing.'79
176 Jeremy Waldron has developed this argument at length. See WALDRON, supra note 1, at 184-
91.
177 See id. at 187 ("[I]n the case of labouring on an object, there are not two things to be brought
into relation with one another but only one thing and an action that is performed on it.").
178 Olivecrona, supra note 70, at 224. In response to this suggestion, Waldron asks: "What about
cases where people identify themselves with resources belong to others-for example, when a man iden-
tifies with the house he has been occupying on a monthly lease?" WALDRON, supra note 1, at 195.
While this question is legitimate, the concern it raises is resolved by the existence of consent in a suc-
cessfully formed contract. The concern Waldron raises here is better addressed to reliance theories of
contract, which do not necessarily build upon the promisor's consent.
179 Corporate entities present a special set of concerns. It should be noted that some theories of
property acquisition will work better than others when extended to contracts between corporate entities.
For example, corporations do not have emotions, and this affects principles of acquisition based on iden-
tification with the acquirer's personality. Although a full treatment of this issue exceeds the scope of
this Article, it merits additional discussion. A property theory can justify the enforcement of intercorpo-
rate contracts, but the analysis is more complex. For a helpful analysis of how these contracts pose a
challenge to autonomy theories, see generally Nathan Oman, Corporations and Autonomy Theories of
Contract: A Critique of the New Lex Mercatoria, 83 DENV. U. L. REV. 101 (2005).
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A similar type of relationship can be conceived of in cases of contracts.
Suppose that a promisee, Jane, has chosen to alter her life's course, laboring
to meet the conditions of a contractual promise. In doing so, she will now
feel that this promised performance is something of hers. She worked for it
and now identifies with it. Admittedly, such identification is a subjective
matter, and contracts are rather abstract things for purposes of extending
one's personality."' The point is that "mixing" labor with things can be
made conceptually plausible when recast in these terms.
A promisee acts with respect to the promised performance, intending to
make it hers based on the promisor's consent. The promisee's understand-
ing is a particular instance of a broader normative intuition. This relation of
action to object is sufficient to produce an understanding that something
rightly belongs to us even if the thing owned does not quite reach the level
of an intimate part of ourselves. We experience the thing as ours. Al-
though such understandings do not permit individuals to own whatever
things they happen to identify with, this sense of ownership carries signifi-
cant normative weight. In cases like contract, where the promisor has also
consented to the obligation, a theory of identification is more compelling.
2. Capture or Creation.-Labor-desert theories respond to the com-
mon intuition that when people interact with external things, they may do so
in such a way that those things become "theirs." In the above analysis, the
emphasis was on the promisee's relationship to the promisor's future ac-
tions. The object acquired was assumed to be the promised performance.
Focusing on the conditional promise itself provides another means to ex-
plain contractual transfers. A promisee has a personal interest in the prom-
ise, not just in the value of the promised consideration. He relates to the
words of the contract.
In some instances, for example choses in action, this relation of owner
to promise is especially pronounced. For example, if you take physical
possession of a bearer bond, you are thought to own the bond and conse-
quently to have the rights that the bond represents. t ' With ordinary con-
tracts, especially oral contracts, this relation of owner to promise may be
less obvious, but one can still discern a possessory relationship between the
promisee and the promise. The contract may not always be physically pos-
sessed in the manner of a bearer bond, but the promisee may, in a sense,
take possession of the obligation, with similar normative consequences.
180 Cf. HARRIS, supra note 63, at 223 ("A claim to ownership based on personhood-constituting
must be psychologically plausible if it is to deserve respect, and its plausibility diminishes to the extent
it is idiosyncratic.").
181 See Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, A Theory of Property, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 531,
582 (2005) ("Bearer bonds and many negotiable instruments... pay a sum of money to the bearer of the
instrument-the paper itself contains the right to receive the money, rather than merely serving as evi-
dence of a debt."). Bell and Parchomovsky capture the idea that the bearer bond is itself property.
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Kant's language captures this idea of owning an obligation. In his
words: "By a contract I therefore acquire another's promise (not what he
promised), and yet something is added to my external belongings; I have
become enriched ... by acquiring an active obligation on the freedom and
the means ... of the other."'82  This conception of owning the promise itself
offers an additional means to describe the acquisition process.
Some examples resemble a capture. In cases of unilateral contracts,
the promise may be open to the world. In such instances, the promisee in a
sense has brought the promise under her control by complying with its
terms first.'83 By acting to meet a condition precedent, the promisee ac-
quires the promisor's consent-it is no longer open to the whims of the
promisor and no longer subject to withdrawal without infringing the pro-
misee's rights.
To illustrate, consider a unilateral contract, where the first person to
meet the terms of an offer has a right to $100. If Jane meets those terms be-
fore anyone else, she can claim that this is now "her" promise, that it has
been brought under her control."4 She is the one described by the promise's
terms who has made its language applicable to the facts under considera-
tion. Its terms can no longer cover anyone else.'85
More generally, one can also recognize that the promisee has labored
to acquire the promised act, but that the actual "thing" the promisee has
changed by her labor is the conditional promise contained in the contract.
182 KANT, supra note t, § 20, at 93. For a more recent expression of this idea, see Charles Fried,
The Convergence of Contract and Promise, 120 HARV. L. REv. F. 1, 5 n.16 (2007) ("A promise is prop-
erty, like a call option that can be traded on a futures market and may actually be embodied in a piece of
paper.").
183 Cf Epstein, supra note 168, at 1224-25 (describing a first-possession theory of property acquisi-
tion); Carol M. Rose, Possession as the Origin of Property, 52 U. CHI. L. REv. 73 (1985) (discussing a
first-possession theory). The classic case is Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. 175 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805). Admit-
tedly, the publicity element implicit in first-possession theories is somewhat different in the contractual
context, as the property at issue is already owned. See Benson, Unity of Contract, supra note 3, at 133
(discussing how the thing to be appropriated "is already subordinated to its owner in a way that can be
apparent to a second party"). As Stephen Smith has noted, however, neither promissory nor reliance
theories of contracts adequately explain the enforcement of unilateral contracts premised on the pro-
misee's performance of a stated condition. SMITH, CONTRACT THEORY, supra note 3, at 183-85. A
property theory like the one in this Article offers an explanation, to the extent the promisee's actions
parallel property acquisition norms in other settings.
184 For a similar insight, see Benjamin L. Fine, Comment, An Analysis of the Formation of Property
Rights Underlying Tortious Interference with Contracts and Other Economic Relations, 50 U. CHI. L.
REv. 1116, 1142 (1983) (comparing the obligee in a contractual relationship to "the pursuer of a wild
animal who has significantly advanced towards capture"). Fine's view of the relation between contracts
and property is distinct from the one in this Article, but the intuition that capture norms apply is sugges-
tive.
185 Note that contracts under seal are not addressed by the property theory in this Article. I agree
with Ernest Weinrib that such contracts "are creations of positive law, which for instrumental purposes
makes available a means of juridically binding oneself." See WEINRIB, supra note 55, at 138 n.30. The
legal treatment of relational contracts may also diverge from this theory for instrumental purposes.
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In this sense, contracts may also involve acquisition through property crea-
tion.'86 The promise represents an interest in the underlying performance,
and this future action is transferred from the promisor, not created. But a
successful contract-one in which the terms of a conditional promise are
met-is brought into existence by the intentional acts of the promisee. This
gives the promisee a proprietary interest in performance as co-author of a
binding promise.1
87
By having an interest in the promise, the promisee also has an interest
in the underlying thing consented to: the promised performance. As with a
bond or a deed to land, the written obligation signifies ownership of what it
describes. In this way, a property right in the promisor's future acts is
transferred, although the means is by creation of an obligatory promise.
Owning a promise is, effectively, to own the actions that the promise calls
for.
3. Embodiment.-In addition, it is possible to recast the acquisition
process by borrowing from concepts of acquisition developed by Hegel. A
Hegelian theory of contract law is distinct from the one described in this
Article in several major respects.'88 But Hegel has described the acquisition
of property in a way that may assist in conceptualizing why it is just for an
individual who meets a promise's conditions to have rights to performance.
Hegel's theory of property acquisition emphasizes the relation between
the acquirer's will and the acquired thing.'89 According to Hegel:
A person has the right to place his will in any thing. The thing thereby be-
comes mine and acquires my will as its substantial end (since it has no such
186 Note, however, that if one adopts a Lockean approach, not all commentators agree that Locke
viewed property acquisition in terms of property creation. See, e.g., Olivecrona, supra note 70, at 226
("In no case do [Locke's] examples of appropriation of movable things imply that a man has created an
object by his work."). The idea that creating something can merit recognition of property rights is nev-
ertheless a common intuition. For further discussion of this type of acquisition theory, see WALDRON,
supra note 1, at 198-201.
187 The acquisition of property based on its creation-for instance, authorship-is often discussed
with respect to intellectual property. For discussions of intellectual property in natural law terms, see,
for example, Wendy Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism in the
Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533 (1993) (providing a natural rights theory of
intellectual property based on Locke's theory of natural law); Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Inspiration and
Innovation: The Intrinsic Dimension of the Artistic Soul, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1945, 1978-80
(2006) (discussing the role played by natural law theory in shaping copyright law). But see Seana Val-
entine Shiffrin, Lockean Arguments for Private Intellectual Property, in NEW ESSAYS IN THE LEGAL
AND POLITICAL THEORY OF PROPERTY 138 (Stephen R. Munzer ed., 2001) (suggesting Lockean theory
does not support intellectual property rights).
188 As noted, the present theory does not comport with Hegel's actual theory of contracts. For re-
cent efforts to explain modem legal doctrine in light of Hegel's contract theory, see, for example, Ben-
son, Abstract Right, supra note 23; and Alan Brudner, Reconstructing Contracts, 43 U. TORONTO L.J. 1
(1993).
189 See, e.g., G.W.F. HEGEL, ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 44, at 75 (Allan W. Wood
ed., 1991) (1820).
A Property Theory of Contract
end within itself), its determination, and its soul-the absolute right of appro-
priation which human beings have over all things.' 9
It may be claimed that a thing has been acquired if it is now intelligible only
in light of the acquirer's will. 9 ' We might share the intuition that property
is acquired when the acquirer's will is, in a sense, embodied in the relevant
thing.'92
Jeremy Waldron provides helpful examples of this idea in cases where
an acquirer has brought about a physical change in an object:
If the object is inanimate (say, a piece of marble formed into a statue) then the
aspect of the object which may be understood only by reference to my will is
one of its physical properties-its shape, for example. If the object is organic,
then maybe it is not merely some property which is understood in this way but
also some ongoing process in the object .... 193
As Waldron notes, an embodiment principle of acquisition has certain
advantages over Locke's labor theory: "We do not have to insist (as Locke
has to) that the willed actions are actually present in the product, only that
the condition (and, of course, the value) of the product is such as to be intel-
ligible only by reference to the will that shaped them."'94 This idea of em-
bodiment can be extended to the contractual setting.
When we view the contractual obligation, we see that the promisee's
meeting of the promisor's conditions alters the nature of the promise. A
conditional promise with its conditions unmet is only binding in a hypo-
thetical world. Once the conditions are met, the promise becomes binding
according to its own terms. A promisee can thus embody his will in the
promise by working to change it from a contingent moral obligation to an
actual, noncontingent duty. The meaning of the promise is now only fully
intelligible in light of the promisee's having met its conditions.
The promise shifts from something that might oblige to something that
does oblige, just as an unsigned law is different from one with a President's
signature. A promisee will naturally think of the promise as "his" now that
the promisee has met its requirements because the promisee's efforts made
190 Id.
191 See WALDRON, supra note 1, at 365 (discussing this idea); cf MUNZER, supra note 63, at 69
("To grasp the importance of causing physical changes in external things it is necessary to see why
Hegel requires that the embodiment of a person's will be recognizable by others. The root idea ... is
that property is an intersubjective concept.").
192 See Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REv. 957, 960 (1982) ("Once
we admit that a person can be bound up with an external 'thing' in some constitutive sense, we can ar-
gue that by virtue of this connection the person should be accorded broad liberty with respect to control
over that 'thing."').
193 WALDRON, supra note 1, at 364.
194 Id. at 365; see also id. at 364 ("Notice again that we are not required to believe here that my ac-
tions or my will literally enter into or become part of the object on which I work. In Hegel's account,
the important thing is that the gap between the subjectivity of the will and the perceived externality of
the objects of the world has been bridged.").
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the promise applicable to actual contingent facts and gave it force. And, at
the same time that the promisee has worked to create the performance obli-
gation, the promisor's consent to be bound limits the promisor's interest in
what has been promised. 9' Given this backdrop, it is reasonable for the
would-be acquirer to stake a claim to ownership.
4. Summary.-There are a number of contending theories for a prin-
ciple of just acquisition of ordinary, physical property. People hold a spec-
trum of views about how we come to rightly possess things subject to
ownership, ranging from a labor theory, to identification, to embodiment of
the will. The above discussion adapts these principles of acquisition to con-
tract-based property. The fit may not be perfect. Yet it is not necessary to
accept any of these theories in their precise shape, so long as the reader
shares the sense that a promisee deserves to own a contractual performance
because he has successfully met the conditions of a conditional promise.
Principles of property acquisition map onto contractual obligations
with little difficulty. Each of the above suggestions recognizes that when a
promisor has met the terms of the contract, the promisor has a new relation
to the promise and to the promised performance. He now has a proprietary
interest in performance. Because of this relation, the promisor's duty is no
longer simply a moral one with no correlative rights attached. Failure to
perform wrongs the promisee by depriving the promisee of his property.
In addition, if the above conceptions of acquisition capture the norms
of a contractual transfer, the norms involved should apply even absent posi-
tive law. Legal conventions are relevant, but not necessary, to the obliga-
tory nature of contracts. Just as an individual would be wronged if
assaulted, even prior to positive law, a promisee would be wronged if he
had met the terms of a conditional promise and the promisor refused to per-
form in full.'9 6
195 Cf. HEGEL, supra note 189, 65, at 95 ("It is possible for me to alienate my property, for it is
mine only in so far as I embody my will in it. Thus, I may abandon (derelinquiere) as ownerless any-
thing belonging to me or make it over to the will of someone else as his possession-but only in so far
as the thing [Sache] is external in nature."). Note also that Hegel takes a very broad view of what can
be external for these purposes. See id. 43, at 74-75 (describing how certain internal attributes may be
given an external existence); see also PENNER, supra note 4, at 176 (discussing Hegel's approach).
196 A full analysis of when courts should provide legal remedies for such violations of moral rights
is beyond the scope of this Article. However, this normative question underlies much of the private
law. For a helpful discussion suggesting how legal wrongs may be connected to enforcement, see gen-
erally Benjamin C. Zipursky, Philosophy of Private Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 623 (Jules Coleman & Scott Shapiro eds., 2002). Zipursky
contends that private rights of action can be understood in terms of an obligation of the state to provide a
right of redress to individuals who would otherwise have rights of redress through self-help. Id. at 643-
44. In my view, Zipursky's theory can be adapted to address the types of contract-based wrongs de-
scribed in this Article. For further analysis, see generally Andrew S. Gold, Consideration and the Mo-
rality of Promising, in EXPLORING CONTRACT LAW (Jason W. Neyers, et al. eds.) (forthcoming 2009).
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C. Explanatory Benefits
Many of the doctrinal implications of a property theory of contracts are
broadly consistent with current contract law and offer a means to better ex-
plain that law. Accepting a transfer-based approach does not require radical
changes to existing law, nor does it impose counterintuitive requirements on
contract enforcement.
For example, the requirement that a promisor consent in order for a
transfer to occur supports several contract defenses. Failure of consent cor-
responds to a variety of legal excuses for nonperformance, including the
doctrines of duress, undue influence, lack of majority, mental incompe-
tence, and fraudulent inducement.'97 In each case, the promisor's consent is
considered inadequate due to the promisor's questionable competence or
lack of a voluntary choice.
As developed below, a property theory also justifies several doctrines
that have historically been more difficult to explain. For example, one can
see the doctrine of consideration and the expectation remedy as an integral
part of contractual obligation. In addition, different types of contract, in-
cluding unilateral contracts and bilateral executory contracts, also fit com-
fortably within a transfer framework.
1. Consideration Doctrine.-The doctrine of consideration reflects
the need for a promisee to act upon the contractual promise such that its
conditions are met. It is a means for a just acquisition of the promisor's fu-
ture performance. Both unilateral and bilateral contracts-including bilat-
eral executory contracts-fit within this conception. While autonomy
theories have sometimes had difficulty with the consideration doctrine, con-
sideration is a core feature of the theory described in these pages.
In the case of unilateral contracts, a promisee's performance is just as
much a means to acquire an interest in a conditional promise as it would be
in other contractual settings. The absence of a preexisting relationship be-
tween promisor and promisee is irrelevant to its validity, and a formal
statement of acceptance is unnecessary. The promisee relates directly to the
promise and acquires the obligation by meeting its terms.
The ability to explain bilateral executory contracts is also a strength.
Critics of promissory theories-and by extension transfer theories-make
their strongest case in the context of bilateral executory contracts.'9 8 With
197 See Barnett, supra note 15, at 318 (describing how these types of defenses fit with a consent
theory).
198 See, e.g., P. S. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 4 (1979) ("The protec-
tion of mere expectations cannot (it is suggested) rank equally with the protection of restitution interests
.. or reliance interests .... A person whose expectations are disappointed, but who suffers no pecuni-
ary or other loss from the failure to perform a promise, has surely a relatively weak claim for complaint
or redress.").
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such contracts, there may be no reliance whatsoever, and the harm in
nonenforcement may appear to be slight if not nonexistent. 199
Charles Fried has provided a good example of such an agreement:
I enter your antique shop on a quiet afternoon and agree in writing to buy an
expensive chest I see there, the price being about three times what you paid for
it a short time ago. When I get home I repent of my decision, and within half
an hour of my visit-before any other customer has come to your store-I
telephone to say I no longer want the chest.200
A contract of this type might be enforced even if the breach occurred just
moments after formation. Such contracts resemble liability on a mere
promise.
The executory contract has thus raised difficult challenges for auton-
omy theories. Executory contracts pose the concern that contract enforce-
ment violates the harm principle. Fried's antique shop example naturally
poses the question: how would the shop owner suffer a harm if the chest is
not purchased? Unlike the situation where one party has performed their
promised half of a bargain by, for example, delivering an object, the execu-
tory contract is seemingly binding prior to either party physically providing
the promised thing. It is questioned whether consideration exists in these
instances.2"'
The longstanding legal enforceability of contractual promises cannot
be used to show that there is adequate consideration in such cases of execu-
tory contracts. Because the whole point is to figure out if such contracts
ought to be enforceable in the first place, the legal enforceability of a prom-
ise is unavailable as a supporting premise.02
Nevertheless, executory contracts can be consistent with the doctrine
of consideration without falling into circular reasoning. An explanation of
how this can occur was suggested over a century ago by James Barr Ames.
Ames noted that there is "[a] difference between the act of a party and legal
result of the act." ' 3 A promise is sufficient as an act-a change of posi-
tion-separate and apart from its legal consequences.
199 In addition, as Joseph Raz notes, many promises that are relied upon would be considered bind-
ing prior to the existence of the reliance. Raz, supra note 11, at 924.
200 FRIED, supra note 87, at 18.
201 Cf P.S. ATIYAH, ESSAYS ON CONTRACT 28 (1986) ("[T]he requirement of consideration or, at
least, the satisfaction of that requirement, in the case of the wholly executory contract, is one of the puz-
zles of the common law.").
202 See Benson, Unity of Contract Law, supra note 3, at 160 n.52 (describing the vicious circle that
arises if a promise is required to be legally binding in order to count as consideration for another prom-
ise, when the legal enforceability of this first promise depends on the status of the other promise as con-
sideration); cf SMITH, CONTRACT THEORY, supra note 3, at 181 ("The usual explanation given by those
who defend the promissory model is that a contract in which each party agrees to do something for the
other party is a pair of conditional promises.... The difficulty with this suggestion is that if each prom-
ise is conditional on the other, neither party is under an obligation to do anything.").
203 See James Barr Ames, Two Theories of Consideration, 13 HARV. L. REV. 29, 32 (1899).
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Viewing promises as consideration is thus consistent with the transfer
theory described in this Article. Although the obligatory force of a mere
promise is different from the force of a legally enforceable contract term, it
is still a type of obligation, and more importantly, it represents a change of
position for the promisee. Promises create moral duties of performance and
as such can be a type of consideration.
To put things differently, even if courts as a rule did not enforce bilat-
eral executory contracts, it would be unjust for the promising parties in such
cases to not live up to their word. A conditional promise is only binding
when its conditions are met. Here, each party's promise acts upon the other
party's promise by meeting its conditions; each promise makes the other
promise's terms obligatory. Mutual promises can thus produce a transfer of
property interests, akin to the transfer that occurs in cases where a promisee
has physically accomplished her half of an agreement. 4
For transfers of physical property, the process is simpler than it is for
transfers of future actions. A transferor can often place a physical object in
a transferee's possession and abandon his own interest." 5 This ease of
transfer reflects the ability of the transferee simply to take possession of a
physical object.2"6 For example, one can do more than just promise to give
a hat to another person: one can physically hand the hat over. This process
does not work for future actions, which by their nature are not physically
available at the time of the contractual agreement.
Consideration is thus integral to successful contractual transfers. Ab-
sent consideration, or provisions of positive law, a promisee cannot attain
an interest in another person's future actions in the same manner that an in-
dividual can attain an interest in a physical thing. But in cases where con-
204 Several commentators have suggested that the theory described in this Article could also support
the existence of a transfer if the promise was merely conditioned on acceptance, as long as the promisee
accepted the promise. Others question whether acceptance alone can enable an act of appropriation by
the promisee. See Benson, Unity of Contract Law, supra note 3, at 156 ("The consideration would con-
sist here simply in the promisee's evaluation of and reaction to the promise; it represents nothing more
than the effect which the promise, with its anticipated benefit, has upon the promisee."). A major diffi-
culty with recognizing transfers based on acceptance of promises conditioned on acceptance is that ordi-
nary promises are often thought to require acceptance in order to be morally obligatory. See FRIED,
supra note 87, at 43 (discussing the importance of acceptance to promising). However, an accepted
promise that was conditioned on acceptance is almost indistinguishable from an ordinary promise that
has been accepted, and the latter category of promise is generally understood to fall short of a transfer.
Despite these concerns, there is an important line-drawing problem raised by this hypothetical, and it
merits further inquiry.
205 Cf PENNER, supra note 4, at 84-85 (explaining the process by which "should anyone wish to
pass his title to anyone else, all he must do is abandon it to him in circumstances where that other is well
placed to take possession of it").
206 Cf Benson, Public Basis, supra note 16, at 296 ("[F]or there to be a completed gift or exchange,
something more is required than just the transferor's act of alienation. The transferee must also take
possession of the transferred object for there to be acquisition."); Benson, Unity of Contract Law, supra
note 3, at 129 (noting distinctions between physical transfers and contracts).
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sideration is provided-even in the form of a promise-a promisee can ac-
quire contractual performance through principles of just acquisition.
2. Expectation Damages.-The corrective justice criterion is also
consistent with viewing contracts as a transfer of property in the promisor's
future actions. The expectation remedy becomes a means of correcting the
wrong committed. When courts seek to put a promisee in the position she
would have been in if the promise were performed, this is consistent with
the promisee owning the promised performance.
Once the content of a promise is understood to be the property of the
promisee based on a successful completion of the promise's conditions, cor-
rective justice calls for a remedy that either provides the promised perform-
ance or its equivalent in value. Assuming a reliance measure would be less
than the expectation measure, the reliance measure provides an incomplete
recovery for damages suffered. The expectation measure compensates for
the harm that results when the promisee does not receive the performance
he or she acquired.
Moreover, tort law also reflects this property-based understanding of
contractual performance. Some theories of property emphasize the distinc-
tion between in personam and in rem rights. Contracts are often distin-
guished from property because of their in personam aspect. In certain
contexts, however, it is apparent that the right to performance of a contract
is good against the world, not just against the promisor.2"7 As Richard Ep-
stein has argued, remedies for wrongly inducing a breach of contract are
comparable to the ostensible ownership cases recognized in other settings.2"8
The fit of these formation and remedial doctrines with a theory of
property transfer suggests that a transfer-based understanding comports
with the core intuitions of the common law of contracts. Contract theorists
have struggled to find an explanation that incorporates consideration and
expectation remedies, as well as unilateral and bilateral contracts, into its
conception of contractual obligation. In this respect, the theory developed
in these pages is not only normatively plausible, but also provides a useful
interpretive account of existing contract doctrine.
IV. POTENTIAL CHALLENGES FOR A PROPERTY THEORY
Notwithstanding the interpretive benefits, the framework for transfers
described in the last Part relies on several ideas that may prove controver-
sial. Some question whether a contractual performance is a "thing" suitable
207 In addition, Curtis Bridgeman has suggested that the transferability of contract rights, and also
third party beneficiary doctrine, indicate an analogy between contracts and property. See Bridgeman,
supra note 49, at 3031-33. However, it should be noted that in contexts where contract enforcement
involves third parties, there is also greater formalism and standardization, reflecting the distinct expecta-
tions of this class of legal actors. See Smith, supra note 172, at 1186-88.
208 Richard A. Epstein, Inducement of Breach of Contract as a Problem of Ostensible Ownership,
16 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 19-20 (1987).
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for ownership. Others question whether performance can be the subject of
a transfer as transfers are ordinarily understood. It may also be asked
whether the judicial tendency to order damages rather than specific per-
formance conflicts with the idea of owning performance rights. Each of
these concerns will be addressed in turn.
A. The "Thinghood" Objection to Owning Performance
An initial challenge stems from common perceptions of what can be
owned. Property is often thought to address legal relations to physical ob-
jects. In some cases, intangible property is also recognized. However,
property is not typically described in terms of ownership of an individual's
acts. The standard instances of legal property thus raise the question
whether a transfer theory of contract is consistent with intuitions of what is
properly subject to ownership.2"9
J. E. Penner's recent scholarship offers insights into the source of this
concern. Legal scholars often think of property as a "bundle of rights,"2 '
but there are other ways to think about property. Penner concludes that
paying attention to the way individuals relate to objects they own also of-
fers insight into the norms of property law.21' This emphasis on the objects
of property tracks a basic intuition of most non-lawyers: the idea that prop-
erty involves rights in relation to things."'
209 An alternative critique suggests the morality of property is different from the morality of con-
tract, in light of differences in the way rights are enforced in these two contexts. Along these lines, Peter
Alces notes the judicial tendency to strictly enforce real property rights, even if a property owner is be-
ing unreasonable in insisting on her rights. In contrast, courts seem more willing to "do equity" in con-
tracts cases. See Peter A. Alces, Unintelligent Design in Contract, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 506, 543-49.
There are several potential responses. For one, the morality of enforcing property rights may vary
across different property contexts. See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Morality of Property,
48 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1849, 1890-94 (2007). In addition, if a contract is clear enough, courts are
willing to enforce contract terms which it would otherwise be unreasonable to insist upon. See Alces,
supra, at 548 n.260. This suggests contract interpretation is involved in the enforcement question. As
Richard Craswell has noted, "to determine what remedy is entailed by a propertized theory of remedies,
we need to determine what property rights were transferred in the first place." See Craswell, Expecta-
tion Damages, supra note 52, at 24. Distinctions between the enforcement of conventional property
rights and contractual property rights may exist based on judicial understandings of the implicit terms of
a contractual agreement. Finally, it should be noted that the theory in the present article is normative
and not solely explanatory. If the morality of contracts diverges sufficiently from the morality of prop-
erty, this could be a reason to reform contract law; it need not be evidence that a property theory is
wrong on principle.
210 For a review of this theory and its influence, see Penner, supra note 72, at 712-14.
211 Id. at 724 ("[T]he bundle of rights picture obscures more than it illuminates, confusing the
boundaries between property rights and other normative relations, and presenting without foundation the
view that we can have a workable idea of property without having a workable idea of the 'things' that
can be owned.").
212 See LAURA UNDERKUFFLER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY: ITS MEANING AND POWER 11-12 (2003)
(discussing the "layman's view that property is 'things'); Thomas C. Grey, The Disintegration of Prop-
erty, in NOMOS XXII: PROPERTY 69, 69 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1980) ("Most
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Penner's suggestion is that, in order to have a workable idea of prop-
erty, "a workable idea of the things that can be owned" is necessary.213 He
emphasizes the importance of having some idea of what "things" are gener-
ally available for ownership, given that cases regularly arise where new
forms of potential property are at issue."1 4 Absent a theory of which
"things" can be owned, analysis of these potential property interests offers
little conceptual guidance.2"5
Yet Penner's explanation of the idea of property presents a challenge
for the theory described in this Article. According to Penner, the objects of
contractual relations do not have the features of those "things" that are
owned as property."1 6
Penner's theory is that, in order for an object to count as property, it
must meet a "separability thesis." This thesis is as follows:
Only those 'things' in the world which are contingently associated with any
particular owner may be objects of property; as a function of the nature of this
contingency, in theory nothing of normative consequence beyond the fact that
the ownership has changed occurs when an object of property is alienated to
another.2"7
The first part of the separability thesis captures the idea that transfer-
ability is a key element of property. Although one may own something that
is not transferable,"' transferability, or at least potential transferability, is an
important feature.219 Things that are hard to imagine transferring are not ob-
jects susceptible to property ownership.
In this way, Penner can treat one's talents and capabilities as nonprop-
erty 2 Relations with regard to things that are "personality-rich" in this
sense do not fit the standard intuition of property ownership, nor does the
people, including most specialists in their unprofessional moments, conceive of property as things that
are owned by persons.").
213 Penner, supra note 72, at 724.
214 Id. at 715-22 (describing the difficulties posed by cases which involve novel questions of
whether something should be considered property).
215 Id. at 721-22 (suggesting the "bundle of rights" thesis perpetuates "a fairly loose and malleable
'definition' of property, which provides no real help in applying the term 'property' to something like
news or body parts").
216 PENNER, supra note 4, at 112-13 (describing differences between contract rights and property
rights).
217 Id. at I11.
218 See id. at 113 ("[l]t is not inconceivable that one might own untransferable property."); see also
MUNZER, supra note 63, at 49 (noting that property rights are not invariably transferable).
219 See MUNZER, supra note 63, at 49-50 ("[T]ransferability is a highly important feature of prop-
erty as usually understood.").
220 See PENNER, supra note 4, at 112 ("A necessary criterion of treating something as property,
therefore, is that it is only contingently ours; we must somehow show why it is ours because it might
well not have been; nothing similar need be said about those things with 'necessary links with particular
persons', like our talents, our personalities, our friendships, or our eyesight.").
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law ordinarily treat them as property. 2  ' As applied to a person's talents,
abilities, or friendships, this is a helpful insight.
However, Penner argues that it is not merely the contingent nature of
the rights at issue that makes a thing suitable for ownership as property, but
also that the object under consideration "might just as well be someone
else 's.'"222 In this way, he distinguishes contract rights from property rights.
With the exception of certain choses in action, such as debts or securities,
contract-based rights are often personality-rich.223 Penner concludes that la-
bor is not separable from the person doing the laboring.2 n
Although the separability thesis is illuminating, this Article suggests it
should not preclude thinking of contracts in property terms. It is true that
contract rights differ from other candidates for status as property. For ex-
ample, in many cases the rights held by a promisee may not be given to a
third party-these rights are only transferrable with the promisor's consent.
But it is far from clear that contracts involve things that are so linked to
one's personality that they should not be considered potential property.
Our relation to objects may shift depending on context. Penner notes
that the property status of a limb or an organ changes depending on whether
its severance from the human body is contemplated.2 People don't tend to
think of a person's kidney as property while they are walking down the
street. In contrast, one may think of a kidney as property when it has been
removed, or is going to be removed, for donation to a relative. Separability
221 See id. at 113-14 ("What makes it impossible to conceive of certain rights as property rights,
such as the right not to be murdered and a great many other rights which are not without distortion
called body rights ... is that one can not conceive of how such rights could be separated from one-
they are the constitutive rights that being a person entails having."). Penner's distinction could also be
justified in consequentialist terms. Cf Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV.
1849, 1905-06 (1987) ("A better view of personhood should understand many kinds of particulars-
one's politics, work, religion, family, love, sexuality, friendships, altruism, experiences, wisdom, moral
commitments, character, and personal attributes-as integral to the self To understand any of these as
monetizable or completely detachable from the person ... is to do violence to our deepest understand-
ing of what it is to be human."). That said, I would question whether a limited ownership of actions, as
described in this Article, is more dehumanizing than a legal system that would prevent such ownership.
The premise of this Article is that even standard, conventional contracts qualify as an instance of trans-
ferring future actions.
222 PENNER, supra note 4, at 112.
223 See id. at 115-18 (discussing the issues raised by choses in action); id. at 130 (suggesting for
choses in action that "[bly removing ... considerations about property to the realm of valuation, the
right itself is stripped down to a right to a 'thing', a piece of the wherewithal of another, the value of
which fluctuates with the value of that wherewithal just as the value of any other piece of property may
fluctuate.").
224 In Penner's view, linking contracts and property confuses both subjects. Id. at 91 ("Believing
that contract conceptually requires the exchange of property rights of some kind leads to believing that
all benefits of whatever kind are species of property, which gives rise to the absurd belief, among others,
that one's labour is something one owns.").
225 Id. at 121 (describing this circumstance).
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from the self is important to our understanding of what can be owned.
Nevertheless, even intimate things can be separated in this fashion.226
In an analogous way, successful contracts can achieve separability.
Even if we do not ordinarily consider our future actions to be property, our
relation to these actions changes in contemplation of a contractual trans-
fer. 27 The promisor's future action, assuming a contract was successfully
formed, is no longer a matter of freely choosing without consequences. A
contract, taken at face value, typically gives a promisee a right to perform-
ance of the offered promise, subject to the promisee meeting certain condi-
tions. For better or worse, we can easily think of our labor as belonging to
someone else.22
There often is a close connection between a person's labor and her self,
but this connection will vary from case to case. Many standard forms of
physical, transferable property are experienced as extensions of our
selves.229 Body parts are certainly closely attached to our selves-for that
matter, even a person's hair could be tightly bound to personality. These
items, however, may subsequently be seen as external from our selves de-
spite their former closeness.
The connection between objects (including actions) and a human per-
sonality is often contingent, and this feature is central to contractual obliga-
tions. Some personality-rich things cannot be transferred, and we may not
even think of them as capable of being owned. Talents and friendships fit
into this category. Other personality-rich things are readily transferred. A
personality-rich starting point does not mean that future actions are incapa-
ble of being owned and transferred.
B. The Conceptual Objection to Transfers of Future Acts
Alternatively, a critique could be based on our intuitions about how
transfers work. For example, Stephen Smith is a proponent of the idea that
contracts enable promisees to acquire a property-like interest in the prom-
226 See MUNZER, supra note 63, at 53 ("[P]arts of one's body seem very intimate, and yet the power
to transfer them is a property right. Again, the right of publicity sometimes covers aspects of a person
that are intimately tied to his or her conception of self, but it is nevertheless a property right.").
227 Cf HEGEL, supra note 189, 1 43, at 74-75 ("Knowledge, sciences, talents, etc. are of course at-
tributes of the free spirit, and are internal rather than external to it; but the spirit is equally capable,
through expressing them, of giving them an external existence [Dasein] and disposing of them ... so
that they come under the definition [Bestimmung] of things."). But see PENNER, supra note 4, at 122
("[Tlhe 'separability' criterion is weakly instantiated by labour because labour is constituted by our in-
tentional actions which form part of our life history, and therefore our identity.").
228 Indeed, in agency relationships, the acts of the agent are frequently attributed to the principal. If
we are determining how the law treats personality-rich "things" as a descriptive matter, then it seems
that the law often contradicts Penner's view.
229 Margaret Radin has noted that certain pieces of personal property can be constitutive of an indi-
vidual's identity, and yet there is little doubt that these are property. See Radin, supra note 192, at 959-
61 (discussing items such as "a wedding ring, a portrait, an heirloom, or a house"). In fact, as Penner
himself notes, "fungible" items may also be constitutive in this way. See PENNER, supra note 4, at 206.
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ised performance.23 ° In that respect, his theory parallels the one offered in
these pages. However, Smith makes an elegant argument against using
transfer theories to support this result. He suggests the rights that are alleg-
edly transferred by means of a contract are not rights that the promisor
originally owned.21  This suggests a problem of fit for transfer-based theo-
ries, because the transferee receives something different from what the
transferor originally possessed.
An excerpt from Smith's argument provides a helpful illustration of the
problem. As he explains:
To be sure, if I agree in a contract to hand over the keys to my house to Jane
next Friday I did, prior to making the contract, have the right to hand over my
keys to Jane next Friday. One of my rights of ownership is the right to alienate
that right. More generally, I have the right, subject to not infringing other
people's rights, to do what I like with my keys next Friday. But this is not the
right that I have supposedly transferred in my contract. According to the trans-
fer theory, Jane's right is not a right to do whatever she wants with my keys
next Friday but rather a right to the performance of my promise.232
The concern is that the promisee possesses something different post-
contract from what the promisor originally owned before the agreement
went into effect. The promisee acquires a right to insist on performance,
while all that the promisor owned, originally, was the right to hand over the
keys, among other potential choices.
Smith's example suggests that transfer theories are confused as to what
is being transferred. The right to insist on handing over the keys was never
owned by the promisor. People do not have rights against themselves. At
first glance, this argument seems quite powerful. How can it be that a pro-
misor is transferring an entitlement, when the promisor does not initially
have the right to performance claimed by the promisee?
Smith is correct that something has changed through the process of
contracting, such that a promisee possesses rights that are quite different
from any of the promisor's rights prior to the contract. The implications of
Smith's argument, however, extend well beyond contract issues. In fact,
they extend to transfers in general.
230 SMITH, CONTRACT THEORY, supra note 3, at 72 ("To avoid the harm principle objection, a
promissory theory must explain why a promisee can fairly be regarded as owning a right to the promi-
sor's performance of the promised act."); Smith, Towards a Theory of Contract, supra note 3, at 123
("On the right-creation view of contract, a contract creates what is in effect a property right in the pro-
misee, albeit a property fight in the performance of an act.").
231 Smith, Towards a Theory of Contract, supra note 3, at 120 ("The fights that contracting parties
are, according to the transfer theory, meant to be transferring are rights they do not own."); see also
OLIVECRONA, supra note 76, at 283 ("If I borrow a sum of money from another person and promise to
pay it back, the creditor is said to acquire the right of claiming payment from me. In no sense is this
fight held to exist beforehand.").
232 Smith, Towards a Theory of Contract, supra note 3, at 120.
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As J.E. Penner has indicated, transfers of property involve a change in
rights. As he explains, "The only thing that is clear when I give property to
you is that you now stand in the equivalent normative position vis-2i-vis the
thing I gave you to the one I just did. Your rights are equivalent to mine." '233
The transferor becomes one of the many nonowners against whom rights
are held, and in this sense we may say that rights are "created" against the
transferor, rather than transferred. This "creation" of rights nevertheless
does not defeat the common understanding that a transfer can occur.
Assume that I own a ten-acre plot of land and that this plot allows for a
variety of uses that I could choose among. I decide to divide my property
in half, and transfer to Ann an interest in the eastern half of the property.
Under these facts, I could freely walk from one end of the property to the
other before the transfer. But after the transfer, I am no longer free to en-
gage in a variety of activities that now constitute trespasses or nuisances.
Ann has thus acquired rights against me that I did not originally possess.
Prior to transferring the land, I could not trespass against myself, or be a
nuisance to myself. As this example suggests, a transfer of an interest in
property can effectively create rights in the transferee that were never held
by the transferor.
Returning to Smith's example above, the would-be transfer of the keys
to Jane implicates the same creation and extinction of rights that all trans-
fers implicate with respect to the original owner. Smith is correct that, be-
fore the contract with Jane, I have a privilege or liberty to decide next
Friday what I will do with my keys. However, I also have rights that others
not improperly interfere with my ultimate choice regarding the keys. One
thing I can insist upon is that others not prevent me from giving the keys to
Jane. What has changed postcontract is that now, I am like one of those
others who might prevent my giving the keys to Jane. Jane, the promisee,
can insist that I do nothing to prevent the handing over of the keys. Rights
that I held that are inconsistent with the transferred rights are extinguished.
The relevant point is that a transfer of a physical object involves the
acquisition of certain rights against the transferor that previously did not ex-
ist with respect to the transferor. There is no reason why a similar change
should not occur with respect to a transfer of an action, once actions are
seen as transferable. Where the original owner of an action would not vio-
late his rights in himself by choosing to exercise his liberty and act differ-
ently, this very same choice may result in a violation of property rights once
the action is owned by another person.234
233 PENNER, supra note 4, at 147.
234 Some property theories emphasize the right to exclude. It is an interesting question whether the
contractual relation can be understood in terms of a right to exclusion. Cf Hansmann & Kraakman, su-
pro note 4, at S410 ("In general, contract rights, like property rights, are 'good against all the world' in-
asmuch as any third party who intentionally interferes with a contractual right commonly faces liability
for tortious conduct to the holder of the right."). If the promisor is thought of like a third party, then it is
also possible to think of the promisee's rights against the promisor in these terms.
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Under Smith's example, if I have the freedom to do a variety of things
next Friday with my keys (for example, leaving them on the table), but I
transfer to Jane my action of giving her the keys, I have also provided Jane
with a right that I not act inconsistently with giving her the keys. My avail-
able options next Friday have been restricted. Jane's right follows naturally
from a transfer of my action-giving her the keys-and this right does not
mean that a transfer as such is a conceptual impossibility. Change in own-
ership of a future action alters the original owner's liberty interests and re-
suits in a right held by the new owner.
The conceptual objection that contracts do not fit with the nature of a
transfer because new rights are created fails. A different type of objection
considers whether the remedies typically provided by courts for breaches of
contract are consistent with the idea that contracts result in ownership of the
promised performance.
C. The Rarity of Specific Performance
Accepting that transfers of actions are a conceptual possibility, it may
appear that contractual performance should be mandated by the courts. Es-
pecially when one's understanding of contract obligations is premised on
property ownership, injunctive relief would appear to be an obvious rem-
edy.235 Instead, courts frequently provide expectation damages, rather than
specific performance.
This poses a distinct challenge for contract theories that assert owner-
ship of the promised performance. As Dori Kimel notes:
[S]pecific performance is the remedy that aims at granting the innocent party
precisely what she bargained for, whereas expectation damages merely aim at
compensating her, albeit fully, for not receiving what she bargained for. At
best, excuse the pun, it is a second best. So why not opt for the best?236
A contract theory grounded in corrective justice would seem to call for the
remedy that best makes the promisee whole, rather than the closest substi-
tute.237
235 See Eisenberg, supra note 47, at 221-22 ("Another basic normative idea that Benson finds in
contract doctrine is that when a contract is formed, each party has a legal right to possession of the per-
formance promised by the other. If that were the case, however, a party to a contract would be entitled
not merely to damages on breach, but to specific performance ....
236 KIMEL, supra note 20, at 95.
237 There are other contexts in which a party receives less than the full expectation measure. A reli-
ance remedy addresses a distinct harm from contractual breach, or else may represent a second-best
remedy. Restitution, as Charles Fried indicates, is not technically a contract enforcement principle.
FRIED, supra note 87, at 26 ("Promise and restitution are distinct principles. Neither derives from the
other, and so the attempt to dig beneath promise in order to ground contract in restitution (or reliance,
for that matter) is misconceived."); cf SMITH, CONTRACT THEORY, supra note 3, at 329 (distinguishing
contract principles and unjust enrichment principles, and concluding that they do not conflict when
properly understood because they address different questions).
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It might be argued that contracts actually involve disjunctive promises
to either perform the promised acts or to pay damages for a failure to per-
form. 38 Certainly, contracting parties can enter into such disjunctive obli-
gations. But, as a general description of what parties intend, or even as an
interpretation of the public meaning of contract language, this explanation
seems inadequate.239 Frequently, agreements do not assert that damages
may be substituted for performance, and there is a general belief that promi-
sors owe a duty to perform the promised acts.
Some of the leading explanations for why courts choose damages in-
stead of specific performance can be squared with a corrective justice
framework. For example, it may be that successful monitoring and imple-
mentation of a specific performance remedy against a noncompliant defen-
dant would be quite costly and perhaps ineffective.24 ° The institutions set to
administer justice may offer second-best measures, given limited budgets
and time constraints. In such instances, it is still plausible to view the cor-
rective justice approach in aspirational terms. The end remains corrective
justice, but the means are constrained by pragmatic considerations.
It appears there is more involved, however, especially if we are con-
cerned with the internal perspective in this area of law. Courts evince a
genuine distaste for forcing the promisor to perform a service contract. As
Anthony Kronman describes this legal point of view: "[E]ven a contract of
short duration that calls for the performance of routine and unobjectionable
tasks is a contract of self-enslavement and therefore legally unenforceable if
it bars the employee from substituting money damages for his promised
performance."24' Many commentators, myself included, are uncomfortable
with the idea that an individual could be forced to perform tasks she does
not want to, absent criminal forfeiture of rights.242
238 Randy Barnett takes this approach as a means to address the issue of inalienable rights. See
Randy E. Barnett, Contract Remedies and Inalienable Rights, in PHILOSOPHY & LAW 179, 197 (Jules
Coleman & Ellen Frankel Paul eds., 1987) ("[A] contract 'to provide personal services' might accurately
be construed as a commitment to transfer alienable rights to money damages (or other alienable re-
sources) on the condition that specified personal services are not performed as promised.").
239 See SMITH, CONTRACT THEORY, supra note 3, at 402 ("It just seems implausible, as a matter of
fact, to regard contracting parties as having agreed, in the typical case, to disjunctive obligations to per-
form or compensate.").
240 See Anthony T. Kronman, Specific Performance, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 351, 373 (1978) ("There is
another common explanation for the reluctance of courts to enforce private injunctive agreements: the
specific enforcement of contracts ... entails special administrative costs which normally can be avoided
under a money damages rule, and private individuals should not be allowed to shift the special costs as-
sociated with this form of relief to the taxpayers who subsidize the legal system."). Note, however, that
Kronman questions this view. Id. at 373-76.
241 Anthony T. Kronman, Paternalism and the Law of Contracts, 92 YALE L.J. 763, 779 (1983).
242 See SMITH, CONTRACT THEORY, supra note 3, at 401 (noting "the idea, common to both com-
mon and civil law regimes, that directly enforcing personal service contracts is undesirable because it is
intrusive of personal liberty").
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It is therefore worth asking whether a judicial tendency to avoid regu-
larly providing specific performance can be reconciled with a corrective
justice understanding of contract remedies. Risks of judicial error and ad-
ministrative cost concerns are only a partial explanation for the manner in
which contract obligations are enforced. Are additional explanations avail-
able?
Dori Kimel has recently suggested an additional possibility. Kimel
adopts an extension of the harm principle to questions of remedies.243 He
then discerns the following norm:
[W]hen it comes to remedies for breach of contract, the harm principle, assum-
ing that it is compatible in the first place with the imposition of legal obliga-
tions in order to prevent or redress the harm which is loss of bargain, counsels
against the employment of the more intrusive remedy whenever the award of a
less intrusive remedy could redress this harm just as effectively.2
Applying this premise, he suggests that "accepting the harm principle en-
tails that specific performance should be awarded only when the less intru-
sive remedial measure, the award of (expectation) damages, could not fully
redress the harm caused through violation of the right."245
Assuming the harm principle extends this far, however, Kimel's re-
sponse does not cover all cases in which courts refuse to require perform-
ance. The difficulty with Kimel's argument is that, in practice, damages are
not truly equivalent to specific performance for all contracts.4 6 Suppose,
for example, that the services called for by the contract are unique services,
only capable of being performed by one individual. A standard market
valuation might undercompensate the promisee.247 Courts may still refuse
to mandate specific performance, yet Kimel's version of the harm principle
would not apply to such cases.
The necessity cases in tort law provide a means to answer this puzzle.
As these cases indicate, it is unjust in certain contexts to preclude a
nonowner's interference with property rights.2 48 For example, it would be
wrong to prevent a drowning man from rescuing himself, despite a need for
243 KIMEL, supra note 20, at 103-09 (suggesting that the harm principle can be applied to the selec-
tion between expectation damages and specific performance).
244 Id. at 104.
245 Id.
246 See Kronman, supra note 240, at 366 ("When the subject matter of a contract is unique, the risk
is greater that the promisee's money damage remedy will be undercompensatory.").
247 Cf Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 181, at 587 ("Often, owners develop sentimental relation-
ships with assets protected by property rights, such that their 'reserve price' (the price at which they
would be willing to sell the object) is substantially in excess of the market price."). As Bell & Parcho-
movsky note, not all cases of gaps between market price and reserve price are irrational. See id. at 569.
For a unique service, a rational gap in value is plausible. See Kronman, supra note 240, at 366 (noting a
greater risk of undercompensation for unique services).
248 The classic example of this fact pattern is Vincent v. Lake Erie Transp. Co., 124 N.W. 221
(Minn. 1910).
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trespass in order to do so. At the same time, it can be unjust not to award
compensation for the damage to property. As will be developed below,
autonomy values support parallel considerations in the specific performance
setting.
The idea that property entitlements can only be justly acquired and
possessed subject to other basic rights is longstanding in natural law think-
ing. For example, Locke's theory of property acquisition was subject to a
proviso that appropriation by labor is only acceptable "at least where there
is enough and as good left in common for others." '249 As Jeremy Waldron
has recently suggested, Locke's writings support a requirement that prop-
erty owners must not prevent others from taking what they need to sur-
vive. 5° This limit is part of the substructure of property rights.
A right to autonomy implicates this type of limitation. When an indi-
vidual's autonomy falls below a certain level, or is limited in a certain man-
ner, it can be inherently unjust."1 Note that this understanding of autonomy
is not equivalent to self-ownership; instead, autonomy values trump self-
ownership rights in certain contexts. 52 In theory, an individual could have
full self-ownership rights and little autonomy; an individual could also have
substantial autonomy and limited rights of self-ownership.
In a case of would-be self-enslavement, there is an external, noncon-
tractual value that rightly precludes the contract altogether.253 However, the
right to autonomy also circumscribes the ownership of actions even in cases
where the actions at issue are subject to transfer. Should a promisor con-
clude that she is simply unwilling to perform the act transferred to the pro-
misee, she may change her mind and repossess the promised performance.
We may say that the right to reassert control over one's actions is inalien-
able, and this alters the strength of contract-based possession such that it
must give way to the promisor's interest in acting differently. 4
This does not mean that the promised future act was never successfully
transferred, nor that the obligation of the contractual promise is anything
249 LOCKE, supra note 13, 27, at 274.
250 Jeremy Waldron, Nozick and Locke: Filling the Space of Rights, in NATURAL RIGHTS
LIBERALISM FROM LOCKE TO NOZICK 81, 88-97 (2005). A similar limit on what natural law permits
individuals to own can be found in Grotius's property theory. See STEPHEN BUCKLE, NATURAL LAW
AND THE THEORY OF PROPERTY 47 (1991) (suggesting that for Grotius "[t]he right of necessity to use
things belonging to another is thus no more than a limit on the natural extent of property, since it cap-
tures those cases where the private owner's advancing of his own interests infringes the rights of an-
other").
251 For a useful discussion of the important features of personal autonomy, see generally RAZ, supra
note 30, at 369-78. Raz suggests that autonomy includes "three distinct components: appropriate mental
abilities, an adequate range of options, and independence." Id. at 372.
252 For example, if self-ownership were construed to permit transfer of any and all body rights, it
could in theory produce slavery by consent. Autonomy values preclude this outcome. For discussion of
how the autonomy value is inconsistent with slavery, see id. at 377.
253 See id. at 377-78 (discussing the importance of independence to autonomy).
254 Note that this is not the same as claiming that one's actions are inalienable.
A Property Theory of Contract
less than full performance. Instead, it means that the autonomy interest of
the promisor is strong enough that she should be permitted to take the prop-
erty from the promisee. Rights can still exist even if they are defeasible.
Just as the public's need can justify eminent domain if the government pays
compensation, the importance of autonomy can justify the promisor's asser-
tion of will over her own body if the promisor pays damages. 5
Jules Coleman's analysis of corrective justice provides a helpful
framework for understanding how corrective justice functions in this set-
ting. As Coleman suggests, a loss is wrongful for corrective justice pur-
poses "if it results either from wrongdoing or a wrong."'256 "Wrongdoing"
falls outside a norm of behavior, while a "wrong" in this context is simply
an invasion of rights.257 So defined, a wrong can occur in cases where a
tortfeasor's acts are actually appropriate as a normative matter.
Coleman explains as follows:
If I act contrary to your right, then I wrong you whether or not I amjustifled in
doing what I did. I may dock my boat at your slip to protect my family from
an impending storm even if I have no right to do so without your permission.
Suppose you refuse me permission. Then it is possible that I could be justified
in my action even though it is invasive of your rights.258
Such cases involve an infringement of rights, but they are not "wrongdo-
ings" because they are justifiable. Note that the tortfeasor's action in
Coleman's example, while morally permissible, would not mean that any
damage to the property interests involved should go uncompensated." 9
In contract cases where the promisor decides not to perform despite
having successfully transferred a property interest in performance to the
promisee, this breach is an infringement of the promisee's rights. It in-
volves commission of a wrong, and corrective justice calls for the pro-
misee's loss to be rectified. But, in light of the role autonomy plays in
circumscribing the promisee's interest in performance, the nonperformance
is a permissible trespass by the promisor.
The promisee often can suffer a harm, though perhaps only minimally,
when a court chooses damages over specific performance. Yet there is an
autonomy principle at stake that restricts the means of corrective justice.
255 Richard Epstein has suggested a parallel between the law of eminent domain and necessity cases
in tort law. See EPSTEIN, supra note 74, at 109-10.
256 Jules L. Coleman, Corrective Justice and Property Rights, in PROPERTY RIGHTS 124, 128 (Ellen
Frankel Paul et al. eds., 1994).
257 Id. at 129.
258 Id. The issue of a justified wrong is discussed at length in JULES L. COLEMAN, RISKS AND
WRONGS 292-302 (1992); see also id. at 371-72 (suggesting in such cases that "[t]he injurer gains as a
consequence of her creating a wrongful loss in others, but her gain is not a wrongful one").
259 For further discussion of Coleman's view of corrective justice in the contract setting, see
Bridgeman, supra note 49, at 3023-26. Bridgeman indicates that this account can explain why contract
doctrine provides for strict liability in cases of breach.
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Payment of damages represents an exercise of corrective justice within lim-
its set by the autonomy value. It may be unjust for the promisor not to rec-
ognize the promisee's ownership of the promised act, yet it would be more
unjust not to recognize the promisor's right to autonomy. 6°
V. IMPLICATIONS OF A PROPERTY THEORY
As noted, many of the most basic features of contract law are consis-
tent with the idea of a transfer of future actions. Providing an adequate jus-
tification for these doctrines is a significant step forward for contract theory.
Even so, there are contract doctrines that cannot readily be derived from the
idea that contracts involve a transfer of property. In some cases, a property
theory is indeterminate as to outcomes. In other cases, the applicable con-
tract doctrine is in apparent tension with the promisor's or promisee's
rights. In these latter cases, a property theory can make an important nor-
mative contribution to the further development of contract law.
Certain doctrines are hard to derive from the approach in this Article,
but can be reconciled with its normative premises. For example, the mail-
box rule for acceptance of an offer is not mandated by a transfer theory, but
it may be readily harmonized with its corrective justice understanding of
contract enforcement. Some method for resolving the questions answered
by the mailbox rule must be selected, and once selected, corrective justice
remains relevant. Barring extreme cases, statutes of limitations and eviden-
tiary rules are also ancillary to the normative structure of contract law.
Such rules indicate that other, noncontractual values play a role at the mar-
gins.
In some instances, contract remedies are hard to explain in purely cor-
rective justice terms. For example, the rule in Hadley v. Baxendale26 2 re-
specting consequential damages is not an obvious product of corrective
justice.263 Under Hadley, compensation is limited to those damages that
260 See COLEMAN, supra note 258, at 298 ("The underlying moral claims may be that the injurer is
justified under certain conditions in appropriating another's property and the victim is entitled in justice
to repair in the event she suffers a loss as a consequence of the injurer's conduct."). For a different take
on these issues in the contract setting, see Daniel Friedmann, The Efficient Breach Fallacy, 18 J. LEGAL
STUD. 1, 18 (1989) ("[l]t is a vast leap from the narrow confines of the necessity cases to the far broader
proposition that there is some general right to violate property or contract rights solely if there is some
willingness to pay the owner's loss."). I agree with Friedmann that there is in fact an entitlement to per-
formance, but would suggest nevertheless that the necessity cases offer important insights for the con-
tract enforcement context.
261 These types of rules are difficult for all autonomy theories to justify. For example, a theory like
Charles Fried's cannot point to any features of promissory obligations which specify the mailbox rule in
its standard form. Cf FRIED, supra note 87, at 52 (describing the mailbox rule as a "rule of conven-
ience"); Craswell, supra note 25 at 522 (noting that Fried recognizes the applicability of other values
than individual autonomy in this context).
262 9 Exch. 341 (1854).
263 Arguably, the decision in Hadley suggests that the law is not merely concerned with rectifying
contract losses in their full amount if we assume that performance is owned by the promisee. Cf SMITH,
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naturally flow from the breach of a contract or to damages in the reasonable
contemplation of the parties. 264
A limit on remote consequential damages may be implicit in the law of
obligations, as Stephen Smith suggests. 265 Alternatively, it may be a tacitly
understood term in the parties' agreement. Yet the precise rule in Hadley is
not clearly specified by the contractual principles described in these pages.
This does not mean that an autonomy theory is incorrect as a normative
framework, but it does indicate the potential explanatory limits of such a
theory.266
However, a property theory of contracts also suggests guidelines for re-
form of existing doctrine. If a court gives the promisee rights that were not
included in the promised performance, the promisor's autonomy is in-
fringed. If the promisor can avoid obligations that were successfully ac-
quired by the promisee, the promisee has been dispossessed of actions he
owns. Legal doctrines that have these effects should either be justified in
terms of values that trump the norms of contractual transfers, or else recon-
sidered.
For example, excuses for nonperformance based on factual develop-
ments that occur after contract formation can reverse a transfer of entitle-
ments. In certain instances, postformation excuses can amount to a taking
of the promisee's interest in the promised performance. On the other hand,
these excuses may also be incorporated into the contract's terms, meaning
that no infringement of the promisee's rights would occur. The key ques-
tion is whether such excuses of performance were so incorporated.267
From a transfer perspective, the doctrines of mistake, frustration of
purpose, and unconscionability cease to be necessary features of contract
doctrine. They may be grounded in the objective meaning of a particular
contractual text, 261 or explained in terms of administrative costs,2 69 or per-
CONTRACT THEORY, supra note 3, at 426 ("[I]t is assumed that the rule is evidence that, contrary to the
traditional understanding, contract law does not actually enforce promises, or if it does, that it does this
only in a weak sense.").
264 9 Exch. at 354.
265 See SMITH, CONTRACT THEORY, supra note 3, at 427 (suggesting that the remoteness rule is "a
general question for the law of obligations"). It has been questioned whether Smith's response is ade-
quate. See Nathan Oman, Unity and Pluralism in Contract Law, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1483, 1498 (2005).
266 Cf Oman, supra note 39, at 865 (suggesting that the duty to mitigate and the requirement that
consequential damages be reasonably foreseeable "suggests that in at least some cases of conflict, eco-
nomic efficiency is being allowed to trump concerns about autonomy").
267 For an analysis of this type regarding the impossibility doctrine, see Bridgeman, supra note 49,
at 3034-39.
268 An effort in this direction has been attempted. For an explanation of mistake and frustration of
purpose as implied-in-fact terms, see SMITH, CONTRACT THEORY, supra note 3, at 297-306. One might
further argue that these doctrines are now implied based on their wide recognition in existing contract
law, even if they would not be properly recognized were courts operating on a blank slate.
269 For example, although unconscionability is often seen in moral terms, it may be recast as a
pragmatic doctrine. See Richard A. Epstein, Unconscionability: A Critical Reappraisal, 18 J.L. &
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haps accounted for by overarching social values,27 but they are not implicit
in a contractual obligation as such. Once it is seen that contract obligations
do not depend on the existence of these doctrines, their normative justifica-
tion must come from other sources.
These implications are significant and merit a more extended treat-
ment. It is worth exploring just how completely existing contract law can
be reconciled with a property theory of contract obligations. Part of this in-
quiry would turn on an analysis of how contractual text ought to be inter-
preted. The significance of owning a promised action is dependent on a
determination of the promise's content. 7
Likewise, it is worth exploring the degree to which external, noncon-
tractual values should affect the implementation of contractual terms. The
nature of contractual obligations leaves some questions unanswered, sug-
gesting room for judicial discretion. In addition, more basic values may de-
feat otherwise legitimate contract rights.
2 72
One proposed means to explain contract law more completely is to
combine different types of theory. Recently, scholars have begun searching
for ways to reconcile autonomy theories with efficiency theories.273 Neither
approach is viewed as adequate on its own to fully explain and justify con-
tract doctrine.274 Instead, each approach may fully explain parts of contract
law. Even if the precise details of certain contract doctrines-for example,
the mailbox rule, consequential damages, and mitigation requirements-
cannot be readily specified by an autonomy theory, an autonomy theory
may supply the fundamental requirements for contract enforcement.
ECON. 293 (1975). In Epstein's view, in its ideal form, "the unconscionability doctrine protects against
fraud, duress and incompetence, without demanding specific proof of any of them." Id. at 302. As
noted, formation-based defenses like duress are acceptable reasons for nonenforcement, because they go
to the question of the promisor's consent. If Epstein is right, then unconscionability doctrine can be rec-
onciled with a property theory based on an assessment of the probability ofjudicial accuracy.
270 For example, this Article presents a theory of contracts that serves the ends of corrective justice.
However, Anthony Kronman has argued that "considerations of distributive justice ... must be taken
into account if the law of contracts is to have even minimum moral acceptability." Kronman, supra note
46, at 474. An argument in favor of a contract-related doctrine on a distributive justice basis-such as
an argument in favor of unconscionability doctrine-might suggest that distributive justice values re-
quire the doctrine, whether or not distributive justice is internal to contract obligations as such.
271 This point has been made powerfully by Richard Craswell. See Craswell, Expectation Damages,
supra note 52, at 20-21.
272 It is also worth considering what implications a property theory of contract may have for regula-
tory actions. The UCC, for example, may be reassessed in terms of property norms. The argument set
forth in this Article is limited to the common law of contracts, and is structured around common law
principles, but it could provide resources for inquiries into other contract-related areas.
273 See, e.g., Kraus, supra note 26; Oman, supra note 39, at 863-74.
274 See Kraus, supra note 26, at 436 ("[E]fficiency theories have a comparative advantage over
autonomy theories as practical, applied theories, and autonomy theories have a comparative advantage
over efficiency theories as foundational normative theories.").
A Property Theory of Contract
Whether autonomy theories can be combined coherently with effi-
ciency and other consequentialist approaches is still an open question. 275 It
is far from clear that these quite distinct perspectives will converge, and it is
also uncertain whether proponents of one or the other perspective could
ever accept the compromises implicit in a joinder. For example, a correc-
tive justice account of contract law would be unlikely to accept reliance
damages as the sole remedy for contract breaches, even if it were demon-
strated that a reliance remedy would be more efficient.
Assuming a pluralistic theory combining autonomy and efficiency
concerns is feasible, a property-based understanding contributes in two im-
portant respects. The first contribution relates to the norms that autonomy
theories usually seek to meet. Autonomy theories have suffered from an in-
ability to meet the requirements of the harm principle, to fit the corrective
justice framework, or to avoid reliance on legal fictions. This is not a slight
failing, and it has cast doubt on the merits of these approaches.
If an autonomy theory is viewed as lexically prior to an efficiency the-
ory, the autonomy contribution should be described in a normatively ap-
pealing, coherent way. A property theory, as described in these pages,
offers a reasonable means to reconcile contract enforcement with both the
harm principle and corrective justice.
The second contribution involves the substantive distinctions among
autonomy theories. Notwithstanding a shared grounding in respect for in-
dividual liberties, different autonomy theories produce different mandates.
For example, Peter Benson contends that unconscionability doctrine is an
inherent part of contractual obligation 6.2 " The theory described in this Arti-
cle suggests that unconscionability doctrine is permissible, but unnecessary
for contracts to bind. On the other hand, this Article indicates that the doc-
trine of consideration is an integral feature of a binding agreement. Charles
Fried's promissory theory suggests it is not.277 In other words, selection
among autonomy theories has explanatory and normative consequences.
CONCLUSION
Contracts involve a bilateral relationship between individuals. The
crux of this relationship is the parties' interaction with a conditional prom-
ise. A promisor's consent is necessary to a contractual obligation. How-
ever, contractual promises also depend on the acts of the promisee, and it is
275 See Richard A. Epstein, Causation and Corrective Justice: A Reply to Two Critics, 8 J. LEGAL
STUD. 477, 503 (1979) ("[T]here is no systematic way within a system of rights to take costs and bene-
fits into account in some 'straightforward' way even if we desired to do so.").
276 See Benson, Unity of Contract Law, supra note 3, at 201 ("No less than the principles of contract
formation, unconscionability is an essential step in defining the voluntary for the purposes of contract
law.").
277 See FRIED, supra note 87, at 35 (critiquing the consideration doctrine as an alternative to his
promissory theory).
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this feature that makes contracts binding. Applying principles of just prop-
erty acquisition, a promisee who successfully meets the conditions of a con-
tractual promise takes ownership of the promised performance itself. The
result is a transfer of property in the promisor's future actions.
A property-based understanding does not mean a second "death of con-
tract." '278 Property doctrine is no more likely to absorb contract law than tort
doctrine. Property in actions and property in other things share certain fea-
tures, but they also implicate different legal results. Instead, the idea of
owning performance provides a stronger justification for the basic structure
of contract law.
This source of obligation clarifies the nature of contractually based du-
ties. Contracts are most comprehensible when seen as transfers, rather than
purely promissory obligations. The duty to keep one's word is a moral
duty, not a legal one. Contracts provide something more that justifies a le-
gal obligation. In contrast to promise-based liability, the norms of transfer
respect the rights of both promisee and promisor without engaging courts in
the regulation of private morality.
Several basic normative premises provide a foundation for assessing
contracts in these terms. Some of these assumptions implicate the proper
role of courts. These include the harm principle and corrective justice as
guidelines for private law adjudication. Other norms are concerned with the
types of freedom individuals are entitled to have. Self-ownership is an im-
portant reason to permit individuals to transfer rights in their future actions.
While it is desirable to adopt a theory of contracts that satisfies the
above norms, contract theories also seek a degree of fit with existing doc-
trine. In this respect, core features of contract doctrine have proven hard to
explain. Doctrinal fit is an additional benefit of viewing contracts under a
property rubric.
For example,, the doctrine of consideration has been difficult for auton-
omy theories to justify. A transfer of entitlements explains the role of con-
sideration. Consideration should be understood as a fundamental aspect of
contractual obligations; providing consideration is how the promisee comes
to deserve ownership of the promised performance. Similarly, expectation
damages have been a puzzle for reliance-based theories. Again, this Article
accounts for this remedy. Expectation damages reflect the promisee's own-
ership of performance.
It is not feasible to bring all of contract law within one unified theory.
Recognizing that contracts are grounded in the ownership of our future ac-
tions, however, resolves many of the problems faced by prior theories. It
offers a new way of explaining how contracts are different from ordinary
promises, and it indicates why contract enforcement is consistent with cor-
rective justice.
278 GILMORE, supra note 100, at 95 (suggesting that contract law would be absorbed by tort law).
